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Abstract
Local environmental action has gained attention and importance in the face of inaction by
the federal government and many states. By taking action when other levels of government are not,
these local governments are fulfilling an important federalism function. Environmental federalism
theory has long highlighted the potential for local governments to play this gap-filling function, and to
fulfill other federalism values. To date, however, environmental federalism theory has not examined
closely the legal basis for local governmental action, and the vulnerabilities that surround that local
authority. In many states, local authority is easily, and often, preempted by the state. Given the
importance of local environmental activity, the looming threat of removal of local ability to act is an
important, and as-yet relatively unexamined, aspect of environmental federalism dynamics.
This Article proposes a new framework—localized environmental federalism—for better
acknowledging the role that local governments play in environmental federalism and environmental
governance, and for thinking through the implications of the loss of local authority over the environment
in the context of environmental federalism. Notably, this is a theory of localized, not localist,
environmental federalism; the framework has no built-in preference for local authority over other actors.
Instead, it endeavors to make clear the realities of local environmental governance and how that reality
affects environmental federalism conversations.
Localized environmental federalism takes as its starting point three central tenets: 1) local
governments play a distinct role in environmental federalism; 2) environmental federalism values may
be impacted by the vulnerability of local authority; and 3) because local authority varies by state in
highly particularized ways, conversations about local environmental governance must become more
particularized too. Using that framework for thinking through the role of local governments in
environmental federalism, it becomes possible to have nuanced conversations about how, why, and
when local actors may be well-suited for environmental action. In a time of pressing environmental
concerns, that knowledge has never been more crucial.
I.

Introduction

Federal action in service of environmental protection has slowed markedly
under the Trump administration.1 State legislatures and governorships in many parts
of the country have similarly eschewed environmental regulation. Meanwhile—and
See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka and Kendra Pierre-Louis, “83 Environmental Rules
Being Rolled Back Under Trump,” THE NEW YORK TIMES (updated June 7, 2019) (cataloguing
environmental regulations reversed or in process of being rolled back by the Trump administration).
1
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not unrelatedly—local governments have enjoyed a particularly fertile period of
innovation in environmental law.2 In many ways, local governments have taken on the
mantle of adapting to climate change, reducing waste, preventing industrial harms, and
other measures to avoid environmental injuries. These actions have occurred for a
variety of reasons,3 and take equally varied forms.
This Article takes the recent surge of local environmental innovation as
prologue, not coda. Local environmental actions are almost universally vulnerable to
preemption by state and federal law, and new trends in preemption have seen states
removing authority from local governments to act in a variety of ways. In this new
dynamic, states do not develop a comprehensive statewide scheme; they simply
remove local authority to act. In doing so, the states eliminate policy innovation at
what is often the one level of governance at which it was occurring. Such actions may
undercut models of governance that focus on the benefits of having multiple actors
available to address policy concerns.
These trends complicate law and policymaking in a variety of fields. The
boundary-spanning nature of environmental problems, however, poses unique
challenges in terms of thinking about trends in state preemption. While scholarship to
date has focused on possible ways for local governments to retain environmental
lawmaking authority in the face of preemption,4 as well as the growing role that local
governments are playing in tackling a variety of environmental problems,5 there has
not yet been a more holistic account of what new preemption dynamics, and the
particular problems they raise, mean for environmental law, environmental federalism,
and environmental governance. This Article fills that gap by focusing on
environmental federalism and the ways that shifting governance dynamics impact
theories of shared authority and the ability to foster overall environmental progress.
The primary goal of this Article is to offer a new framework for thinking about
local governments in the context of environmental federalism. Local governments
have been frequently included in theories of environmental federalism, and pointed to
as important actors within the landscape of dynamic federalism and multiscalar
governance that has characterized recent environmental federalism trends. In this way,
environmental federalism is similar to the federalism conversation more generally,
which has moved toward the inclusion of substate actors. The discussion of local
governments as federalism actors tends to focus on the potential for these local entities
to play a role in fulfilling federalism values such as dynamism, gap-filling, exercise of
voice, and experimentation. The realities of local authority, however, mean that the
ability of local governments to fulfill those values may be limited in certain
circumstances.
See, e.g., Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, Urban Environmental Renaissance, Cal. L. Rev. 35
(2020).
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Sarah Fox, Home Rule in An Era of Local Environmental Innovation
5 See, e.g., Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __.
2
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To lay the groundwork for thinking about a more localized environmental
federalism, this Article describes in Part II the current federal, state, and local role in
addressing environmental issues, as well as the political dynamics facing many local
governments. Part III provides an overview of environmental federalism theory in the
United States, including an account of how local governments fit into that theory. Part
IV explains how local governments have generally been grouped with state actors, in
ways that may obscure important structural differences. Finally, Part V articulates a
framework for localizing environmental federalism, and proposes several tenets that
might help to guide discussion of local governments as environmental actors. This
final Part explains how using these tenets can provide the kind of nuanced discussion
of local governments necessary for a full understanding of their potential and
limitations.
As with all accounts of preemption and federalism,6 this Article is a product of
its time. Even in its temporal particularity, however, it speaks to broader dynamics
within the United States. State and local relationships are certain to shift again; their
current form, however, will affect the ability of government to meet the environmental
challenges of the coming decades. An accurate assessment of the potential for current
environmental protection efforts starts with an acknowledgement of the structural
differences at all governmental levels. Thus, the current moment has lessons for
theories of environmental governance, and for accounts of environmental federalism
overall. A more localized lens will allow the environmental federalism field to continue
its rich tradition of pathbreaking, focused on acknowledging the realities on the ground
and looking to how best to attain the values of federalism going forward.
II.

Current Trends in Environmental Law and Policymaking

The story of environmental law has long been one of gap-filling, or of one
level of government stepping in to correct for the failures of another. 7 The classic
narrative of environmental law in the United States starts with local authority. Local
governments have long been responsible for addressing environmental health and
safety. With varying levels of enthusiasm and effectiveness, local governments used
zoning and nuisance doctrines to prevent certain environmental harms,8 invested in
necessary infrastructure, planned green spaces, and generally tried to head off certain
William Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU Envtl. L.J. 108, 108 (2005)(noting that
“policy analysts should seek to distinguish events that are the result of particular historical
opportunities and context, from propensities and incentives that are more stable and predictable
under current forms of environmental federalism”).
7 See, e.g., Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __.
8 See, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa & Jonathan Rosenbloom, “The cost of federalism: ecology, community,
and the pragmatism of land use,” in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 246, Kalyani Robbins, ed. (2015); Robert V. Percival, Christopher H.
Schroeder, Alan S. Miller & James P. Leape, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (8 th
ed.) Wolters Kluwer, at 67-68 (noting that the common law relied primarily on nuisance doctrine to
resolve environmental controversies).
6
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environmental harms in their communities. For example, nuisance law was used at
times to resolve conflicts over matters such as odors from livestock, and pollution
from industrial facilities.9 State governments also took an early lead in regulating
environmental issues, including air and water quality.10
Local resources and authority were ultimately insufficient for needed
environmental progress.11 Spillover effects inherent in many environmental problems
meant that action by one locality could be rendered irrelevant by a neighboring
jurisdiction that refused to curb the issue.12 Natural resources that fail to follow
jurisdictional lines meant limited effectiveness for local or state actors attempting to
govern the resource. Beyond those physical realities, political realities also rendered
early eras of environmental regulation inadequate. Specifically, many ill effects on the
environment were the product of industries that were of great importance to local
economies.13 The resulting reluctance to regulate contributed to failures of local
environmental controls. And even where local governments decided to take on an
environmental problem, the tools at their disposal proved inadequate for confronting
the complexities of environmental harms.14
These local failings, combined with similar failures of regulation at the state
level, combined to produce a series of post-industrialization environmental crises. By
the mid-twentieth century, states began to step up their regulatory efforts regarding
the environment.15 Attempts by states to control problems such as air and water
pollution were relatively ineffective, however. By the middle of the twentieth century,
the federal government began providing assistance to states in their efforts to impose
environmental controls.16 Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s, modern federal

Robert V. Percival, Christopher H. Schroeder, Alan S. Miller & James P. Leape, Environmental
Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (8th ed.) Wolters Kluwer, at 68-71 (noting that the common law
relied primarily on nuisance doctrine to resolve environmental controversies).
10 See, e.g., Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Chandos Culleen, Engines of Environmental Innovation: Reflections
on the Role of States in the U.S. Regulatory System, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 435, 439 (2015).
11 See, e.g., Percival, et al., supra n. ___, at 93 (“State laws and local ordinances to protect public health
and to require the abatement or segregation of public nuisances were common, although they were
poorly coordinated and rarely enforced in the absence of a professional civil service”); Hirokawa &
Rosenbloom, supra n. __ at 246.
12 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation
of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1216 (1977).
13 See, e.g., Caitlyn Greene & Patrick Charles McGinley, Yielding to the Necessities of A Great Public Industry:
Denial and Concealment of the Harmful Health Effects of Coal Mining, 43 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev.
689, 701 (2019); Robert V. Percival, Christopher H. Schroeder, Alan S. Miller & James P. Leape,
Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (8th ed.) Wolters Kluwer, at 71 (“In a society that
encouraged industrial growth, many judges were reluctant to award injunctions against private
nuisances if they involved activities that had considerable economic value”).
14 See, e.g., Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570, 600 (1996).
15 See, e.g., Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570, 600 (1996).
16 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Christopher H. Schroeder, Alan S. Miller & James P. Leape,
Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (8th ed.) Wolters Kluwer, at 94-95.
9
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environmental law was born.17 During these two decades, the United States Congress
passed the first incarnations of nearly all of the major environmental law statutes.18
This transition to federal authority over environmental issues occurred for a variety of
reasons, including the ecological damage that had occurred under the prior system,
new political realities, and a push by regulated entities for a more centralized system
of governance.19 With one piece of broad environmental legislation after another—the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and many others—
Congress provided protection to resources and constrained actions that had previously
been unregulated.
With the passage of these major federal statutes, however, Congress did not
wholly eliminate the role of states in environmental law. Instead, many of the landmark
environmental statutes set up important federal-state cooperative relationships.20
Environmental policy innovation has continued to occur at the state level, and states
have stepped in at various points to build upon the federal regulatory floor, and to
pressure the federal government into action it was otherwise reluctant to take.21
Beyond that, local governments have continued to play an important role in
environmental law, particularly through their continued control over land use, but also
by participating as actors in federal regulatory programs.22
In this way, the federal government filled in gaps in regulation because of
failures at the state and local level; state governments have similarly played a role in
filling federal and local gaps.23 Fast-forward to today, and a similar gap-filling story is
being used to explain the burst of local environmental action currently taking place
around the country.24 These kinds of shifting dynamics are not surprising; indeed, “[a]s
long as our country at all levels is ruled by a system of elected government, then the

See, e.g., Esty, supra n. __ at 600.
Robert V. Percival, Christopher H. Schroeder, Alan S. Miller & James P. Leape, Environmental
Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (8th ed.) Wolters Kluwer, at 97-98.
19 See, e.g., Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Chandos Culleen, Engines of Environmental Innovation: Reflections
on the Role of States in the U.S. Regulatory System, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 435, 441 (2015).
20 See supra section __ for discussion of cooperative relationship between federal and state
governments in environmental law.
21 Supra Section ___.
22 Examples of local governments acting within structure of federal statutes, supra section [ ].
23 See, e.g., Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Chandos Culleen, Engines of Environmental Innovation: Reflections
on the Role of States in the U.S. Regulatory System, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 435, 450 (2015) (“Another
manner by which states are driving environmental regulation is by using environmental regulation to
fill gaps left by the federal environmental regulatory scheme,” and providing examples); William W.
Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 108, 114 (2005) (“when federal
environmental action appears to be ‘underkill’ of what written laws and regulations have historically
allowed or required, it creates opportunities for environmentally oriented citizen and state actors . . .
to supplement federal enforcement or challenge the legal adequacy of the newly relaxed regulatory
environment”).
24 See Wyman & Speigel-Feld, supra n. __ at __.
17
18
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degree of environmental fervor at each level will inevitably fluctuate.”25 The goal of
this section, then, is not to provide an explanation of environmental governance
dynamics in perpetuity, but to describe the political forces currently in play and the
results for environmental law and policymaking.
A. Federal Government
Over the course of the administration of President Donald Trump, the
executive branch of the federal government has retreated from environmental
protection.26 Under the prior administration of President Barack Obama, the federal
government undertook major environmental regulatory efforts.27 Now, in over 80
rulemakings, the Trump administration has reversed, rolled back, or made progress
toward reversal in a variety of environmental areas, including air pollution and
emissions, drilling and extraction, infrastructure and planning, animals, toxic waste,
water pollution, and others.28 This federal abdication is expected to have hugely
negative consequences for the country’s ability to meet current environmental needs.29
The absence of a federal executive lead on environmental issues is particularly
felt in the absence of a plan for climate change.30 One high-profile instance of federal
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU Envtl. L. J. 108, 113 (2005); see also,
e.g., William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 Wm. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 65-66 (1997) (reviewing history of local, state, and federal
environmental, hazardous waste, and Brownfields regulations, and noting that “one finds different
institutions at different points in time appearing innovative or inflexible, dedicated or lax, active or
lethargic”).
26 See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Protecting the Environment in an Era of Federal Retreat, FIU Law Review, at 89 (2018) (detailing federal retreat from environmental action under Trump Administration); William
Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 1037,
1043 (2017) (“As this Article goes to press, the new administration of President Donald Trump has
overtly declared plans to revisit and roll back climate progress.”).
27 See, e.g., David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Policy, Federalism, and the Obama
Presidency, at 366-91, PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, Volume 46, Issue 3, Summer 2016.
28 See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka and Kendra Pierre-Louis, “83 Environmental Rules
Being Rolled Back Under Trump,” THE NEW YORK TIMES (updated June 7, 2019); see also, e.g.,
Harvard Law School Environmental & Energy Law Program, Regulatory Rollback Tracker,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/; Columbia Law School Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law, Climate Deregulation Tracker,
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/; Brookings Institute,
Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/trackingderegulation-in-the-trump-era/; see also, e.g., Craig N. Johnston, Resisting Deregulation: How Progressive
States Can Limit the Impact of EPA’s Deregulatory Efforts, 48 Envtl. L. 875, 876 (2018).
29 See, e.g., State Energy & Environmental Impact Center, NYU School of Law, “Climate Health &
Showdown in the Courts: State Attorneys General Prepare to Fight,” Special Report (March
2019)(https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/climate-and-health-showdown-in-the-courts.pdf);
see also, e.g., Denise Grab & Michael Livermore, Environmental Federalism in a Dark Time, 79 Ohio St. L.J.
667, 667 (2018).
30 Sarah Adams-Schoen, Beyond Localism: Harnessing State Adaptation Lawmaking . . ., 8 Mich. J. Envtl. L.
185, 188-89 (2018).
25
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reversal of environmental regulations was the administration’s withdrawal of the Clean
Power Plan rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during
the administration of President Obama.31 The Clean Power Plan, which “sought to
reduce emissions from power plants by 32 percent below 2005 levels by 2030,”32
represented the first limits on carbon emissions from U.S. power plants, an important
step by the federal government toward combatting climate change.33 On June 19, 2019,
the Trump EPA issued its final rule governing emissions from power plants.34 Dubbed
the Affordable Clean Energy rule, it provides states with substantially greater authority
to set emissions limits than they would have had under the Clean Power Plan.35
Another major reversal of asserted federal authority occurred in the context of
the Clean Water Act. A series of hard-to-reconcile decisions coming out of the
Supreme Court interpreting the Act’s language left many open questions about the
extent of the federal government’s jurisdiction over non-navigable water in the United
States.36 To provide greater clarity regarding the reach of federal authority, in 2015 the
Obama administration promulgated the “Clean Water” rule.37 The Trump
administration withdrew the Clean Water rule, and proposed its own “Waters of the
United States” rule.38 The scope of federal protection of waterways was significantly
greater under the Clean Water Rule than the Waters of the United States rule.39
Other examples of federal reversal on environmental policies, or of handing
authority back to the states, abound. In 2019, the Trump administration reversed the
See 40 C.F.R. Part 60, “Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources,” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-10-16/pdf/2017-22349.pdf; see also, e.g.,
Zack Colman, “Trump Administration is Repealing Obama’s Clean Power Plan,” E&E News,
Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-administration-is-repealingobamas-clean-power-plan/
32 Yale Environment360, Trump Administration Rolls Back the Clean Power Plan,
https://e360.yale.edu/digest/the-trump-administration-rolls-back-the-clean-power-plan
33 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, What is the Clean Power Plan? (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/how-clean-power-plan-works-and-why-it-matters. The Clean Power
Plan was stayed by the Supreme Court on [date] and never took effect.
34 https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/affordable-clean-energy-rule
35 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: Proposed Affordable Clean Energy Rule—
Overview, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/ace_overview_0.pdf;
see also, e.g., Nathan Rott, National Public Radio (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/21/639396683/trump-moves-to-let-states-regulate-coal-plantemissions
36 See Rapanos, SWANCC, others; see also, e.g., Michael Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126
Yale L.J. 636, 638 (2017).
37 “Clean Water Rule: Definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’” 80 Fed. Reg. 37053, available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/06/29/2015-13435/clean-water-rule-definitionof-waters-of-the-united-states
38 Coral Davenport, “Trump Removes Pollution Controls on Streams and Wetlands,” NY Times
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/climate/trump-environment-water.html
39 See, e.g., Ariel Wittenberg, E&E News, “Clean Water Act: How Does Trump Compare to Obama
on WOTUS?,” https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060109451
31
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Obama administration’s rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline permit40 and issued a
presidential permit to authorize construction.41 Construction of the pipeline, if it goes
forward as expected, may have detrimental impacts for threatened wildlife,42 as well as
increase carbon emissions from the production, transport, and combustion of oil from
Canada’s tar sands.43 The Trump administration has also rescinded protections for
endangered species,44 cut EPA budgets for planned environmental clean-ups,45
announced plans for lessening requirements for environmental impact reviews under
the National Environmental Policy Act,46 revoked California’s preexisting authority to
set its own emissions standards under the Clean Air Act,47 and walked back many other
federal environmental policies.48
The discussion of current federal environmental lawmaking activity has thus
far covered only the executive branch and administrative agencies. This narrow focus
is intentional, and reflects the fact that the United States Congress has long since failed
to be a leader in environmental lawmaking. There have been no new environmental
law statutes passed for over thirty years, with only occasional amendments of those
federal statutes already in place.49 Even during the Obama administration, the
Democrat-controlled Congress failed to pass sweeping legislation that would have put

See, e.g., Amy Harder & Colleen McCain Nelson, “Obama Administration Rejects Keystone XL
Pipeline, Citing Climate Concerns,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administration-to-rejectkeystone-xl-pipeline-citing-climate-concerns-1446825732
41 See Presidential Permit (March 29, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/presidential-permit/
42 See Caitlin McCoy, Grace Weatherall, Leilani Doktor, “Keystone XL Pipeline,” Regulatory Rollback,
Harvard Law School Environmental & Energy Law Program,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/keystone-xl-pipeline/
43 See, e.g., NRDC Issue Brief, “Climate Impacts of the Keystone XL Tar Sands Pipeline” (October
2013), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/tar-sands-climate-impacts-IB.pdf
44 See Caitlin McCoy, Grace Weatherall, Robin Just, “Greater Sage Grouse Protection,” Regulatory
Rollback, Harvard Law School Environmental & Energy Law Program,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/greater-sage-grouse-protection/
45 See Hana Vizcarra & Robin Just, “Chesapeake Bay and Nonpoint Source Programs,” Regulatory
Rollback, Harvard Law School Environmental & Energy Law Program,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/chesapeake-bay-and-non-point-source-programs-tmdls/
46 https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2018-13246.pdf
47 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Final Rule: One National Program on Federal
Preemption of State Fuel Economy Standards, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehiclesand-engines/final-rule-one-national-program-federal-preemption-state#rule-summary
48 See, e.g., Popovich et al., “83 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump,” supra n. __;
Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Climate Deregulation Tracker,
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/; Brookings Institute,
Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/trackingderegulation-in-the-trump-era/
49 See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, “How the U.S. Protects the Environment, from Nixon to Trump,” The
Atlantic (March 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/how-the-epa-andus-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-trump/521001/
40
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in place a scheme of carbon emissions caps and trading.50 To put it mildly, a leadership
vacuum as to environmental issues exists within the current legislative and executive
branches of the federal government.51 This is not the first time that such a
decentralizing trend has occurred in environmental law.52 Its latest incarnation,
however, couples with other trends to produce the impacts that are the focus of this
Article.
B. States
The fifty states53 that make up the United States have wildly different
topography, ecology, and other environmental conditions. They have a similarly varied
approach to environmental policy and environmental management, influenced both
by the different physical characteristics in play as well as the different political
circumstances found in each state.54 The level of variety at the state level makes
difficult any attempts to generalize regarding the states’ relative levels of environmental
progress. There are states within the United States making great strides on
environmental policy and innovation, as well as states that fall far short in providing
adequate environmental protections for their citizens and surroundings.
A number of states55 have taken up the mantle of environmental protection,
in both their executive and legislative branches. For instance, in the wake of the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, governors from several states
pledged to promote the emissions reductions that the United States committed to as
part of the Paris Agreement.56 Currently, twenty-four states are members of the
Alliance, representing 55 percent of the population of the United States and an $11.7
See, e.g., Lee Wasserman, “Four Ways to Kill a Climate Bill,” The New York Times (July 25, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/opinion/26wasserman.html?_r=1&hp
51 The federal judiciary has been at times responsible for environmental law advances. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. EPA. Because the focus of this discussion is on policymaking, however, it does not
include updates on the federal judiciary.
52 See, e.g., Mark K. Landy, “Local government and environmental policy,” in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN
AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY, Martha Derthick, ed. (Cambridge University Press 1999), at 227
(noting then-current decentralization theme in environmental policymaking).
53 Because this Article is focused on the traditional relationships between federal, state, and local
authority, it will not focus on the five U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. These territories, however, also have a
highly diverse set of environmental conditions and issues.
54 See, e.g., Center for Progressive Reform, “The States’ Role in Environmental Protection: the Debate
Over Devolution,” http://www.progressivereform.org/perspDevolution.cfm
55 For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to states as a unitary body. As other scholars have
pointed out, however, that is far from reality. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1272 (2009) (“the state is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’”).
56 See, e.g., United States Climate alliance, “Alliance Principles,”
https://www.usclimatealliance.org/alliance-principles; see also, e.g., Leanna Garfield & Skye Gould,
“This map shows which states are vowing to defy Trump and uphold the U.S.’s Paris Agreement
Goals,” Business Insider (Jun. 9, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-states-uphold-parisagreement-2017-6.
50
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trillion economy.57 States acting in concert opposed the replacement of the Clean
Power Plan,58 and, over a decade earlier, created a regional cap-and-trade system;59
individual states have also worked to implement renewable portfolio standards and
energy efficiency standards to reduce carbon emissions.60 State adaptation plans are
also in place or in progress in many states.61 California, long a national leader in
solutions to environmental problems, has continued to innovate in a number of ways,
including mandating consideration of climate risk in insurance policies and creating its
own state-level cap-and-trade program. It has not done so without roadblocks—
notably, in September 2019, the Trump Administration revoked California’s longstanding waiver of preemption under the Clean Air Act with regard to its greenhouse
gas and zero emission vehicle programs.62 Washington has developed its own cap and
trade program;63 New York State recently approved a congestion pricing charge for
New York City;64 and multiple states have pioneered in bringing environmental justice
concerns into permitting decisions.65 Other examples of states making progress on
environmental issues abound.
State-level action on a variety of environmental issues has continued despite,
and perhaps because of, at-times active hostility and inaction by the federal
government.66 Currently, the politicized nature of environmental policy means that
such policy initiatives are often adopted along liberal/conservative fault lines. Thus,
United States Climate Alliance, 2019 Fact Sheet, available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21c9361/t/5cc8666a2831800001f65e7c/1
556637291297/USCA+Factsheet_April+2019.pdf
58 Letter to Andrew Wheeler, August 21, 2018, available at
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/State_Energy_Environment_Leaders_CPPreplacement_initial-response_August%2021_2018_FINAL.pdf; see also, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Bloc
Party Federalism, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 279, 279 (2019).
59 See, e.g., The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: an initiative of the New England and Mid-Atlantic
States of the US, https://www.rggi.org/; Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities As "Norm Sustainers": A
Role for Subnational Actors in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 37 Va. Envtl. L.J. 1, 20 (2019); Robert
L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and
Policy, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 719, 782 (2006).
60 See, e.g., Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities As “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for Subnational Actors in the
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 37 Va. Envtl. L.J. 1, 20 (2019).
61 See, e.g., Georgetown Climate Center, “State and Local Adaptation Plans,”
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/plans.html
62
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Final Rule: One National Program on Federal
Preemption of State Fuel Economy Standards, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehiclesand-engines/final-rule-one-national-program-federal-preemption-state#rule-summary
63 https://apps.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=173-442&full=true#173-442-010
64 Jesse McKinley & Vivian Wang, “New York State Budget Deal Brings Congestion Pricing, Plastic
Bag Ban, and Mansion Tax,” The New York Times (March 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/nyregion/budget-new-york-congestionpricing.html?module=inline
65 Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Chandos Culleen, Engines of Environmental Innovation: Reflections on the
Role of States in the U.S. Regulatory System, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 435, 454 (2015).
66 See, e.g., Denise Grab & Michael Livermore, Environmental Federalism in a Dark Time, 79 Ohio St. L.J.
667, 668 (2018).
57
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states currently controlled by Democrats are more likely to see action on
environmental issues.67 Currently, however, the Republican party is quite dominant in
state government; “Republicans controlled a record thirty-three governorships in
2016.”68 Beyond that, “in over two-thirds of the states, one party governs the executive
and both houses of the legislature.”69 These political and other differences mean that
states are not universally welcoming to environmentally protective policies. Instead,
the current trend is toward liberal and conservative state “blocs,” with federal
alignment depending on the party affiliation of the President.70
The litigation over climate policy over the past several decades offers a prime
example of the divide that exists between competing groups of states on
environmental issues. Massachusetts v. EPA, the case brought to compel EPA to classify
carbon dioxide as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act, was filed by a coalition of
progressive states and public interest organizations.71 A coalition of conservative states
opposed the lawsuit.72 Similar divides were apparent in litigation over the Clean Power
Plan, with 24 states filing suit to enjoin the Plan73 and 18 states intervening in support
of EPA.74 Beyond litigation, the same divide between progressive and conservative
states and relative support for environmentally protective policies can be observed in
differences in activity in state adaptation planning,75 species protection,76 and a variety
of other environmental issues.
Many factors go into the environmental strategies that states pursue at any
given time. In consequence, lack of any one kind of environmental measure in a state
is unlikely to serve as a perfect proxy for the overall policy climate. Nonetheless,
relative activity versus inactivity on state environmental policy often maps on to

Brigham Daniels, Come Hell and High Water, FIU Law Review (“many states and cities, mostly those
run by Democrats, have gone down the path of California . . .”); see also Denise Grab & Michael
Livermore, Environmental Federalism in a Dark Time, 79 Ohio St. L.J. 667, 667 (2018) (noting differences
in environmental policies between “red” states and “blue” states).
68 Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at 35.
69 Michael S. Greve, Bloc Party Federalism, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 279, 283 (2019).
70 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Bloc Party Federalism, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 279, 293 (2019).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Bobby Magill, “The Suit Against the Clean Power Plan, Explained,” Climate Central (April 12,
2016), https://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-suit-against-the-clean-power-plan-explained-20234
74 Environmental Defense Fund, “List of Supporters of the Clean Power Plan in Court,” available at
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/list_of_supporters_of_the_clean_power_plan_in_c
ourt.pdf
75 See, e.g., Georgetown Climate Center, “State and Local Adaptation Plans,”
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/plans.html (providing chart with summaries of state
action in adaptation planning, or lack thereof)
76 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Michael Robinson-Dorn, “Turning power over to states won’t
improve protection for endangered species,” The Conversation (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://theconversation.com/turning-power-over-to-states-wont-improve-protection-forendangered-species-87495
67
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political affiliation of the state government.77 In that way, the federal environmental
policy vacuum is in some instances replicated at the state level, as the state bloc aligned
with the current federal administration may also choose not to pursue environmental
regulation.
C. Local Government
Many environmental issues have highly local consequences.78 As described,
local governments have long worked to solve those problems through traditional tools
like zoning and nuisance actions.79 More recently, however, local action on
environmental issues has entered a new period of considerable activity.80 Local
governments of varying sizes have engaged in efforts to promote sustainability
through climate policy, transit programs, toxics controls, and others.81
Local governments are particularly engaged in planning for and adapting to the
effects of climate change.82 Already, many local governments have begun to grapple
with the challenges that climate change may bring.83 According to a survey by the
Alliance for a Sustainable Future, a coalition between the U.S. Conference of Mayors
and the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, sixty percent of the 158 cities that
responded had launched or significantly expanded a climate initiative or policy in
2018.84 These actions are varied, but include changes to infrastructure, transitioning to
more sustainable forms of energy, reductions in emissions, planning for extreme
E.g., Christopher Seilers, “How Republicans came to embrace anti-environmentalism,” Vox (June 7,
2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/4/22/15377964/republicans-environmentalism
78 Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation . . .86
Yale L.J. 1196 (“Decisions about environmental quality have far-reaching implications for economic
activity, transportation patterns, land use, and other matters of profound concern to local citizens”).
79 See, e.g., Esty, supra n. _ at 600 (describing early local action on environmental problems, including
smoke abatement ordinances, regulation of garbage dumping, and other private nuisance actions).
80 See, e.g., Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at 41-53 (providing extensive overview of
different kinds of local environmental action, including green infrastructure, parks, air pollution,
climate change, buildings, and use of zoning authority); Fox, supra n. _ at 580; Shannon Roesler,
Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (2015)(noting that
“[l]ocal governments have become major players in addressing the most pressing environmental and
public health concerns,” and providing examples); “Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce
Global Warming Pollution,” Hearing before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and
Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, June 19,
2007 (“cities are already promoting transit-oriented development, planning to reduce sprawl, and
supporting mass transit and bicycle paths to reduce global warming pollution”).
81 Fox, supra n. _ at 581.
82 Sarah Adams-Schoen, Beyond Localism: Harnessing State Adaptation Lawmaking . . ., 8 Mich. J. Envtl. L.
185, 188-89 (2018).
83 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama
Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237, 273 (2011) (collecting sources discussing state and local initiatives
to address climate change).
84 See, e.g., “Mayors Leading the Way on Climate: How Cities Large and Small are Taking Action,”
Alliance for a Sustainable Future, available at http://www.usmayors.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/uscm-2018-alliance-building-report-baldwin-small-7.pdf
77
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weather, focusing on air and water quality, and many others.85 Local leadership on
environmental issues is expected to continue to increase,86 and to be increasingly
important.87
To be sure, not all local governments have the desire or capacity to be at the
forefront of environmental regulation,88 nor are all environmental problems best suited
for action by local governments.89 Indeed, local leaders are often the first to call for a
strengthened federal response.90 Local activity on environmental issues in general, and
on climate change in particular, has been taken in response both to the local reality of

See, e.g., Testimony of Stephen K. Benjamin, Mayor of the City of Columbia, South Carolina,
“Learning from Across the Nation: State & Local action to Combat Climate Change,” House
Committee on Energy & Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment & Climate Change (April 2,
2019), available at
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/T
estimony_04.02.19_Benjamin.pdf; Mayor Jacqueline M. Biskupski, Testimony before the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change (April 2, 2019),
available at
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/T
estimony_04.02.19_Biskupski.pdf; Testimony of Mayor James Brainard, City of Carmel, Indiana,
“Lessons from Across the Nation: State and Local Action to Combat Climate Change,” House
Committee on Energy & Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment & Climate Change (April 2,
2019), available at
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/T
estimony_04.02.19_Brainard.pdf
86 See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2-Remedying the Urban Disadvantage Through Federalism
and Localism, 77 La. L. Rev. 1045, 1048 (2017).
87 See, e.g., Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at 4 (arguing “that major cities have a growing role to
play in securing environmental protection not just because of the current political climate in
Washington, but for fundamental structural reasons.”); Daniels, supra n. __ at __ (“these sorts of
regulatory backstops are exactly what our federal system requires or allows for. . . . as a significant
portion of our society lives in large cities, these actions taken by large cities should not be
discounted—these are large portions of the economy.”).
88 Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. _ at 36.
89 See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: the Vertical Axis, 39 Colum. J.
Envtl. L. 390, 393-94 (2016)(noting possible problems and inefficiencies in leaving land use aspects of
climate adaptation to local governments); Daniel Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution,
50 Ariz. L. Rev. 879, 914 (year)(“whatever we might say about climate change, it is assuredly not a
purely local problem”); David R. Berman, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY,
POLITICS AND POLICY (2003), at 33-34 (noting that “[d]ifficult questions . . . have been raised
concerning whether local governments are up to the task of regulating land use, in part . . .because the
nature of the growth-control problem is so vast and complex that it cannot be done through a go-italone, piecemeal, city-by-city approach.”).
90 See, e.g., Testimony of Stephen K. Benjamin, Mayor of the City of Columbia, South Carolina,
“Learning from Across the Nation: State & Local action to Combat Climate Change,” House
Committee on Energy & Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment & Climate Change (April 2,
2019), available at
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/T
estimony_04.02.19_Benjamin.pdf
85
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environmental problems,91 as well as the political reality of federal and state retreat,92
and is highly context-specific.93
Nonetheless, the current situation might be summarized thus: little
environmental progress is occurring at the federal level. In the face of federal inaction,
some states have become more active in environmental problem-solving. In trends
often falling along political lines, however, some states have also stagnated on
environmental progress. Even in states that show little in the way of environmental
policymaking, local governments have begun to adopt a wide variety of measures to
tackle current environmental problems, and to protect their citizens from
environmental harm. This trend is consistent with general trends of gap-filling over
the past several decades—when one or more levels of government is unable or
unwilling to tackle environmental issues, other levels of government step into the
void.94 This interplay therefore forms an important element of any conversation about
current environmental law and policy in the United States.
These interactions are not the end of the story, however. As local governments
have entered this period of increased policy activity, they have also met with another
new dynamic—aggressive forms of preemption, or actions by state legislatures to
remove their authority to act. The federal system requires a way to mediate conflicts
between levels of government, and preemption provides one of those mechanisms at
the federal-state, state-local, and federal-local level.95 At a basic level, preemption
describes the ability of one level of government to override the decisions of another.
In its most straightforward form, preemption is express. Where the preemption is
express in nature, any legal and theoretical conflicts are likely to center on the
appropriateness of its use, not on defining the space left over to the subordinate level

Id.
See, e.g., Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at 30-32 (providing reasons for the emergence of cities
as leaders on environmental issues, including 1) economic incentives for them to do so; 2) an increase
in resources for some cities; and 3) political reactions to federal withdrawal from the field); Rebecca
Bratspies, Protecting the Environment in an Era of Federal Retreat: . . . , 13 FIU L. Rev. 5, 9 (2018).
93 William Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU Envtl. L.J. 108, 119 (2005) (discussing
flaws in analysis of state and local environmental action that points “to an area of federal or state
activity without looking to see what previous actions and regulatory requirements might have
influenced those actions”).
94 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, Harvard Law &
Policy Review (2013); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 719, 778 (2006); Robert V.
Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1170
(1995)(“environmental law is replete with instances where matters traditionally viewed as local
concerns eventually have been subjected to national regulation because of the failure of state or local
authorities to address burgeoning environmental problems”).
95 See Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested
Governance Commons . . . ”, 64 Hastings L.J. 1273, 1309, 1311-12 (2013)(noting that state preemption of
local authority in the environmental realm may help to solve commons governance issues).
91
92
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of government. Traditionally, at least in the federal-state context, express preemption
has been somewhat rare.96
Over the past decade, however, as cities took increasing action on a variety of
issues, many state legislatures also began to experiment with taking away that authority.
States began to rescind local authority to act on a variety of issues via methods that
resembled express preemption, in that the state legislation involved specifically set out
to disrupt local authority. Called in various works, “new,”97 or “hyper,”98 preemption,
it differs from old preemption in several key ways—it is often,99 though not always,100
political; it is generally deregulatory in nature;101 and it has become increasingly punitive
for local governments.102 Substantial scholarship has documented the rise in this kind
of preemption by the states, and the impacts on local governments.103 The state and
local relationship has varied over time, and some of these currently prominent
dynamics—states removing local authority in a politically targeted fashion—are not
entirely new.104 They are nonetheless notable in terms of the severity and broad
E.g., David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 507, 509 (2008);
David R. Mandelker & Dawn Clark Netsch, State and Local Government in a Federal System: Cases
and Materials, at 217 (1977) (observing that, at time of publication, instances of express preemption
were rare).
97 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2018).
98 See, e.g., Erin Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State and Local Relationship?, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1469, 1473 (2018).
99 Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 181, 188 (2017); Richard
Schragger, CITY POWER, at 70 (“conflicts over state-municipal authority are proxies for political fights
that have nothing to do with the pros and cons of decentralization”).
100 See, e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L.
Rev. 823, 828 (2019) (discussing new dynamic of states preempting local land use to respond to
housing availability/affordability concerns); William Fulton, In Fights Between States and Cities, It’s Not
Just Red vs. Blue, https://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-preemption-local-lawsblue-states.html
101 Franklin R. Guenthner, Reconsidering Home Rule and City-State Preemption in Abandoned Fields of Law,
102 Minn. L. Rev. 427, 429 (2017) (“The legal trend in the cities discussed above, however, has been
toward parent political bodies passing preemptive laws without prescribing affirmative policies to
replace the newly defunct ordinances, effectively abandoning the field of law and nullifying it at the
local level.”); see, e.g., George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal
Power in Home Rule, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 643, 682 (1993) (“In some court decisions, preemption
encompasses express denial unaccompanied by any state regulations, as well as situations where a
person or entity cannot obey both a set of state regulations and a municipal set.”).
102 Scharff, supra n. __ at __; Briffault, supra n. __ at 2002-2004; Richard Briffault, Laurie Reynolds &
Nestor Davidson, NEW PREEMPTION READER.
103 See generally, Briffault, supra n. __; Briffault, et al., supra n. __; Scharff, supra n. __; Richard
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1163 (2017).
104 See, e.g., David R. Berman, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES . . . , at 59 (discussing period in
the 1860s and 1870s when state legislatures regularly took away local powers, altered local structures
and procedures, and substituted local judgments with those of the state), 83 (noting that
“Massachusetts ended rent control by a statewide vote in 1994—even though the only communities
with rent control voted to keep it. This was a clear case of statewide norms prevailing over local
norms. This action came after landlords had unsuccessfully challenged rent controls in the courts and
failed as well to get the state legislature to overturn or restrict the enabling statute.”).
96
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impacts of individual state efforts, as well as the national scale of the trend. While not
always successful, these and similar state actions leave local policies vulnerable to
preemption in ways that are distinct from past trends.
In the environmental realm, new forms of preemption have been used to
remove local authority over hydraulic fracturing restrictions, plastic bag bans, pesticide
restrictions, confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) siting, climate adaptation
policies, and others.105 Thus, at the same time that local governments have increasingly
taken on the mantle of environmental protection efforts, many of them have
experienced increased vulnerability in the status of their ability to act. The relationship
of those two trends is significant when thinking about the true potential for local action
and local environmental authority.
III.

Local Governments and Environmental Federalism

As the preceding Section set out, the relationship of local government activity
and local government vulnerability poses a new question for environmental law and
governance. Understanding when and why local governments will be able to take
environmental action is crucial for current discussions, which often focus heavily on
the potential for local initiative in the face of federal and state inaction.106 Such
conversations often begin in the territory of localism, a forum that helps to explain the
interactions between the states and their substate units.107 Of late, however, local
governments have also been brought into the fold of federalism, which may offer a
more comprehensive look at how local governments fit into both theories and practice
of government in the United States.
Contextualizing and understanding changing relationships among
governmental actors often takes place under the umbrella of federalism,108 which in
the United States is both a theory of governance and a matter of constitutional law.109
In each respect, it refers to allocating authority among levels of government within a
See infra. n. ___.
See, e.g., Fox, supra n. __ at __; Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at __.
107 David Barron
108 See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, Emory L.J. 345 (2017)(“Both
the theory and practice of federalism are primarily concerned with two questions: (1) which level of
government is best situated to enact legal rules addressing a particular problem, and (2) what values or
purposes does this choice serve”); see also, e.g., William Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the
Climate Challenge, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 1037, 1047 (2017)(“Where federalism is at its most important, or
at least most often in play, is in . . . choices about how legislation and resulting bodies of regulation
should allocate or preserve federal, state, and sometimes local authority”); Erin Ryan, Negotiating
Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward
(describing federalism as “a strategy—an innovative technology of good governance—representing
our best attempt to accomplish a set of basic, good-governance principles in the system of
government we have created”).
109 Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, Harvard L. & Pol’y Rev.
(2013), at 35.
105
106
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federal system.110 It is not synonymous with a preference for a particular level of
government,111 but rather reflects “a strategy for good governance, based on a clear set
of values.”112 Those values have been articulated in a variety of ways.113 In broad terms,
however, they focus on experimentation, local knowledge, and democratic
accountability. While all of these values are interconnected,114 the relative weight given
to each may lead to different preferences in terms of power allocation.
Environmental and other federalism scholarship has been doing the work of
thinking about substate governments in the context of the federal system for many
years.115 Though not without controversy, this opening of federalism beyond the strict
federal and state universe has occurred in response to the reality of local governments
exercising their voice116 and initiative abilities, and reflects the realities of current
governance structures in the United States. As environmental federalism literature has
evolved, it has extolled the virtues of dynamism and multiscalar governance, and has
recognized the benefits that substate actors may bring in their ability to tackle novel
environmental problems such as climate change. Even while the ability of local
governments to help fulfill some of federalism’s values has been noted, however, the
fundamental differences between state and local governments has not been fully part
of these discussions. As such, environmental federalism theory to date has generally
not considered the vulnerability of local authority in some states, and has not fully
grappled with the federalism impacts of that vulnerability. This Section provides a
basic outline of environmental federalism principles, along with a discussion of the
ways in which local governments have been incorporated into those theories.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1332 (2004).
111 Chemerinsky, Empowering States, id.
112 Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance,
2017 WIS. L. REV., Forward.
113 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, “Environmental federalism’s tug of war within,” at 362, in THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, Kalyani Robbins, ed.
(2015)(listing five “foundational good governance values that American federalism is designed to
advance,” including the maintenance of “(1) checks and balances between opposing centers of power
that protect individuals; (2) governmental accountability and transparency that enhance democratic
participation; (3) local autonomy that enables interjurisdictional innovation and competition; (4)
centralized authority to manage collective action problems and vindicate core constitutional promises;
and finally (5) the regulatory problem-solving synergy that federalism enables between the unique
governance capacities of local and national actors for coping with problems that neither can resolve
alone.”); Ann Carlson, “Reverse preemption in federal water law,” at 231 in THE LAW AND POLICY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, Kalyani Robbins, ed. (2015)(noting
that federalism values include “encouraging policy experimentation and diversity, respecting local
preferences and taking advantage of local knowledge and information about the area of regulation”);
see also Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within (pp. 34-67)
114 Erin Ryan, “Environmental federalism’s tug of war within,” at 363-65, supra n. __.
115 Supra section __.
116 Heather Gerken has focused on this exercise of voice as one of the values that substate actors
provide within the federal system. See, e.g., Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, Harvard Law Review
(2010).
110
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Following the trajectory of the environmental federalism conversation makes clear the
important role of local governments in federalism conversations, as well as why the
vulnerability of local authority presents an important new wrinkle.
A. Introduction to Environmental Federalism
Environmental law provides fertile ground for conversations about
federalism.117 Erin Ryan has posited that environmental law is uniquely interwoven
with federalism concerns because “environmental law is an area where both federal
and state claims of authority are at their strongest.”118 Federal claims of authority are
strong in environmental law for a variety of reasons. In the early days of federal
environmental lawmaking, Richard Stewart famously outlined some of the core
rationales in support of centralized environmental law: addressing the tragedy of the
commons, or the race to the bottom; disparities in political representation; correcting
market failures that lead to externalities; and obtaining advantages of moral action on
a national scale.119 These same rationales may still support an argument for centralized
control. For instance, environmental law scholars invoke the idea of a “race to the
bottom” in justifying federal regulation. The race refers to the idea that jurisdictions
compete for industry and residents, and that jurisdictions will be disinclined to impose
optimal levels of environmental regulation for fear of impeding their competitive
advantages.120 While the existence and extent of the race to the bottom has been
disputed,121 the problem of local competition is often invoked in support of centralized
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good
Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward (describing environmental law as being “at the epicenter of
federalism controversy,” or “the canary in federalism’s coal mine”); see also Michael Livermore, The
Perils of Experimentation, 126 Yale L.J. 636, 651 (2017); Michael Burger, It’s Not Easy Being Green . . . , 78
U. Cinn. L. Rev. at 853 (“Preemption doctrine, as applied to environmental law, is situated in the
broader policy debate between federalization and devolution. Whether conceived, either descriptively
or prescriptively, as cooperative, contextual, dynamic, adaptive, interactive, iterative, or polyphonic,
environmental law has long sought an appropriate balance between a centralized scheme and local
authority.”); Heather Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale L.J. 6, [ ] (2014)
(“environmental federalists, in particular, have been key movers [in fleshing out more
textured/sophisticated account of state policymaking roles], offering a comprehensive account of the
ways in which these unconventional forms of federalism improve policy outcomes”); Marc K. Landy,
“Local government and environmental policy,” in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL
DEMOCRACY, Martha Derthick, ed. (Cambridge University Press 1999), at 238 (“Environment is a
good test of the modern-day merits of Tocquevillean federalism because it is a hard case. Air and
water move.”).
118 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good
Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward.
119 See, e.g., Esty, supra n. _ at 603.
120 Id. at 603-04.
121 See, e.g., Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check
in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 55, 61 (1998); see also, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103
117

Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1105 (2009); Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich.
L. Rev. 570, 609 (1996).
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environmental governance. Beyond that, disparities in political representation may
result in suboptimal levels of environmental regulation; the same is true for problems
of regulatory capture, which may be easier for regulated sources to achieve due to
favorable regulation at the state level.122 Federal authority in environmental law is also
often justified based on scale, or the boundary-crossing nature of environmental
problems.123
In tension with those concerns is the strong claim to power that state
governments have when it comes to many environmental issues. State power has
historically been at its strongest when talking about local control over land use and
property rights.124 Beyond that, scholars have advanced a number of arguments in
favor of decentralized environmental regulation that tend to be based on one or more
of the following: the benefits of diversity and/or the diseconomies of regulatory scale;
skepticism of the race to the bottom problem; public choice claims; rejection of
morality-based arguments; and an assumption that spillover or externality effects are
insignificant.125 Advocates for decentralization often focus on the value of
experimentation and diversity, and the importance of tailoring to local conditions.126
Representation, or public choice theory, is also often levied in favor of more localized
control. Such discussions may take the form of suggesting the greater accountability
of local decisionmakers, or be focused on questioning whether federal power is really
better positioned to combat the problems of interest-group politics.127 Other skeptics
of centralized power over environmental regulation may question the moral
assumptions of Stewart’s theory, and whether externalities—if they exist at all—justify
federal regulation.128 The various arguments regarding one level of environmental
regulation versus another reflect questions of institutional competence, scale, and the
complexities inherent in environmental issues.129 Given these complexities, it is
perhaps unsurprising that “[a] hallmark of environmental federalism is that neither
federal nor state governments limit themselves to what many legal scholars have
deemed to be their appropriate domains.”130
These competing claims to authority are complicated further by the inability
to confine environmental problems such as air and water pollution within set
William B. Buzbee, State Roles in U.S. Environmental Law & Policy, 14 NYU ENVTL. L. J. 108, 111
(2005).
123 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1104 (2009)(“[t]he
most compelling and obvious case for federal regulation is in the presence of interstate externalities:
states lack the incentive to regulate more stringently to reduce pollution that enters other states,
making federal regulation necessary to correct this market failure.”).
124 Kalyani Robbins, Introduction, at ix, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2015).
125 See, e.g., Esty, supra n. _ at 606-07.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 610-11.
128 Id. at 612-13.
129 Adelman & Engel, supra n. _ at 1796.
130 Id.
122
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jurisdictional boundaries. The physical realities of environmental issues can make it
difficult to apply traditional theories of power allocation. For instance, the matching
principle, which attempts to match “the scale of governance to the scale at which the
interest lies,”131 has been used to justify certain distributions of authority.132 In the
environmental realm, boundary-spanning problems and competing governance
interests at each level render this inquiry less useful.133
These questions of relative authority, scale, and complexity lend a great deal of
vitality to the environmental federalism arena. At root, the concerns animating
environmental federalism mirror concerns in the broader federalism conversation.
That is, debates in environmental federalism, like debates about federalism more
generally, focus on the virtues of federalization versus centralization, and on
devolution versus decentralization,134 all in service of the question of how to assess
which level of government is best suited to regulate environmental problems. That
question has been answered in a variety of ways.
Dual federalism was the regnant theory in the United States until the 1930s.135
The dual model conceives of the federal and state governments as independent
sovereigns, with spheres of authority that overlap minimally, if at all.136 Dual
federalism’s “core issue” is the “the separation of state and national power.”137 To
achieve that separation, dualism theory involves the setting of rules and creation of
doctrines that keep state and federal actors within their respective spheres and account
for the allocation of power to one level of government versus another.138 Accounts of

Kalyani Robbins, Introduction, at xi, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2015); see also, e.g., Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 570, 624 (1996)(“[i]t is well established that . . . efficiency in the provision of a collective
good requires the jurisdiction of the government that provides it to match the boundaries of the
good”).
132 See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra n. _ at 1798.
133 See, e.g., David A. Dana, One Green America: Continuities and Discontinuities in Environmental Federalism in
the United States, 24 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 103, 109 (2013); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 Minn. L.
Rev. 1796, 1798-99 (2008) (discussing problems with applying matching principle to environmental
problems).
134 Michael Burger, The (Re) Federalization of Fracking . . . , 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1483, 1490-92 (2013).
135 Daniel J. Elazar, “Cooperative Federalism,” in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, Daphne A. Kenyon & John
Kincaid, eds. (Urban Institute Press 1991), at 67.
136 Shannon Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 11161117 (2015); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward A Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 246
(2005); Daniel J. Elazar, “Cooperative Federalism,” in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, Daphne A. Kenyon & John
Kincaid, eds. (Urban Institute Press 1991), at 67.
137 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward A Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 246 (2005).
138 See, e.g., Roesler, supra n. _ at 1122.
131
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dual federalism rely on a variety of theories to support the chosen allocation of
power.139
Environmental law has never existed in a strictly dual federalist universe.
Instead, from the beginning of modern environmental law, the field has involved
substantial interaction among multiple levels of government. Structurally, many of the
major federal environmental law statutes involve schemes of cooperative federalism.140
“[U]nder the classic cooperative federalism model, the federal government sets overall
program mandates and goals,” which states can then assume responsibility for
meeting, subject to continued federal oversight.141 Reflecting this model, the Clean Air
Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Safe
Drinking Water Act are all examples of federal environmental statutes that incorporate
a cooperative structure by establishing “national minimum standards that can be
implemented and administered by states subject to federal supervision.”142 While
cooperative federalism schemes set out relative powers as a formal matter, in practice
the respective actors and their interests are very much intertwined.143 Cooperative
federalism in the environmental realm offers the benefits of a national standard that
can eliminate concerns over a “race to the bottom” in environmental quality.144 These
same national standards may, however, sacrifice either efficiency or diversity and
innovation.145
Within and around cooperative federalism, another category of federalism
theory has emerged over the past several decades. Generally speaking, new theories of
federalism in the environmental context and in other fields applaud the dynamism of

Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, Emory L.J. 350 (2017).
See, e.g., Michael Burger, The (Re) Federalization of Fracking . . . , 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1483, 1498
(2013)(“the cooperative federalism structures of SDWA, RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA are all
designed to capture the benefits that inure to state regulation of environmental pollution without
sacrificing a baseline of protectiveness that ensures greater equality, and environmental and public
health, across the country”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
Yale L.J. 1256, 1276 (2009)(“Environmental regulation has long been
cooperative federalism’s stomping ground”); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1107 (2009)(“There are many substantive environmental areas in which states
and the federal government have overlapping areas of jurisdiction whereby both levels of government
are essentially free to regulate.”).
141 Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 UC Irvine L. Rev. 177, 179 (2018).
142 See, e.g. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 Md.
L. Rev. 1141, 1174 (1995).
143 Dana, supra n. _ at 110 (noting that in cooperative federalism, “states end up having huge influence
over the as applied substance an as applied actual enforcement of environmental law, but it can be
next to impossible to say how much and what is due to federal initiative and pressure and what is due
to state choice and intent,” and that “there are arguable federal and state interests at stake in almost
every environmental issue and problem”).
144 See, e.g., Percival et al, Environmental Regulation (8th ed), at 128.
145 See Adelman & Engel, supra n. _ at 1813.
139
140
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the power relationship between national and subnational levels of government,146 and
emphasize the elimination of the “zero-sum” nature of power allocations under dual
federalism schemes.147 Instead, state and federal authority is fully concurrent,148 and
sources of power are multiple and independent.149 The general attributes and values of
dynamic federalism are plurality, dialogue, and redundancy,150 as dynamic federalism
theories account for a regulatory space that is being governed by overlapping actors
and is “constantly negotiated and contested.”151 These theories of federalism are both
descriptive and normative. On the descriptive side, they detail how interactions
between the federal and state governments actually occur, and account for constant
interactions and renegotiation of power.152 On the normative side, such accounts are
focused on the “value of interaction and dialogue” between and among different levels
of government.153 Rather than trying to assign power to one level of government over
another, these dynamic forms of federalism are focused on how overlapping
governmental authority can best be used to solve the problem at hand.154 For their
proponents, one of the chief benefits of these federalism frameworks is that they
“ensur[e] that if one governance level fails to address a problem, another can step up,
and if multiple levels respond, they can learn from each other’s efforts.”155 In these
more modern and more pluralistic accounts, federalism is a messy and interactive
business, but one that ultimately upholds the values associated with a federal structure.
Dynamic federalism has developed into a powerful dominant strain in
environmental law scholarship. Under this general umbrella,156 environmental
federalism scholars have articulated many different ways to think about power-sharing
Cf. Elazar, supra n. _ at 77 (“Any proper theory of cooperative federalism must have a dynamic
dimension; in other words, it must be able to track the sources of change in the system”).
147 Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, Emory L.J. (2017).
148 Roesler, supra n. _ at 1122.
149 Robert A. Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS, University of Chicago Press (2009), at 95.
150 Id. at 98-101; see also Shannon Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1111, 1148 (2015) (citing R. Schapiro and others).
151 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1695, 1700, 1707 (2017)(describing dynamic
forms of federalism and praising focus in NFIB on bargaining process between state and federal
government rather than on preserving spheres of authority).
152 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2011); see also, e.g., Dave Owen,
Cooperative Subfederalism.
153 Owen, supra n. _ at 224 n.316, 225.
154 Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, at
96.
155 Owen, supra n. _ at 224; see also, e.g., William Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate
Challenge, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 1037, 1039 (2017)(advocating for a theory of federalism hedging, or “the
regulatory choice to retain overlapping, interacting, and often intertwined federal and state roles” even
under circumstances that might otherwise call for one ideal regulator); Sarah E. Light, Precautionary
Federalism and the Sharing Economy, Emory L.J. 338 (2017)(advocating for “presumption in favor of
multiple regulatory voices/against broad exercises of preemption under conditions of uncertainty”).
156 Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62
Ala. L. Rev. 237, 276, 281 (2011).
146
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relationships within environmental law that are constantly in flux157—called, in various
works, interactive;158 iterative;159 diagonal;160 adaptive;161 contextual;162 or negotiated.163
Each of these variations on environmental federalism is the subject of rich scholarship,
and this Article does not attempt to fully capture the nuances contained in each. What
these environmental federalism varieties have in common, however, is an embrace of
the important role of multilevel governance responses in effective environmental law
and policymaking and in providing checks on the other levels.164 Overall, the current
trend in environmental federalism scholarship and theory is toward a recognition of
the messiness of the federal system in general, and of environmental regulation in
particular. Because of the inherent complexity of environmental issues, environmental
federalism scholars often eschew arguments in support of regulation by a particular
level of government, and instead focus on the importance of multiscalar governance
mechanisms that reflect, create, and promote overlapping authority.
B. Local Governments in (Environmental) Federalism
Thus, current environmental federalism scholarship makes clear the
importance of overlap and the tradition of gap-filling. What may be less clear, at least
at first glance, is the place of local governments, which “occupy an ambiguous place
in American federalism.”165 There is a long tradition in the United States of excluding

Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1107 (2009).
Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action
on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 448 (2008).
159 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097 (2009). Professor
Carlson defines iterative federalism as a process by which “one level of government . . . moves to
regulate a particular environmental policy area. The initial policymaking then triggers a series of
iterations adopted in turn by the higher or lower level of government. The process then extends back
to the policy originator, and so forth.” Id. at 1100. The theory of iterative federalism looks to the
interaction of federal and state law, and focuses in particular on “regulatory schemes under which
federal law has granted a state or group of states special regulatory power[.]” Id. at 1100, 1107.
160 Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, Alabama Law Review. Professor Osofsky
proposes diagonal federalism as a means of discussing four different dimensions in which climate
change regulation takes place. Id. at 273.
161 Adelman & Engel, supra n. _ at 1801 (advocating for an adaptive model of federalism that accounts
for complexities within the federal system).
162 William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU ENVTL. L. J. 108 (2005); William
W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49-56
(2003)
163 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism As A Strategy for Good
Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. Forward 17, 20 (2017).
164 Erin Ryan, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN; JB Ruhl; Robin Kundis Craig; Esty, supra
n. _ at 653; Alice Kaswan, “Cooperative federalism and adaptation,” in THE LAW AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 197, Kalyani Robbins, ed. (2015) (noting
the various roles that federal, state, and local actors may play in climate adaptation).
165 See James Q. Wilson, “City life and citizenship,” in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL
DEMOCRACY, Martha Derthick, ed. (Cambridge University Press 1999), at 17.
157
158
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local governments from conversations about federalism,166 or of collapsing them into
their respective states.167 The debate about whether or not local governments are
properly part of the federalism conversation continues today.
The Constitution does not provide an explicit place for cities within the federal
structure.168 On that basis, some scholars find the inclusion of local governments in
any discussion of the federal structure to be untenable.169 And indeed, if the federalism
dialogue is confined to the corners of the Constitution and a dualistic conception of
governmental authority, then the failure to include local governments in the federalism
conversation is unsurprising.170 Functionally, however, as both a matter of practice and
of common understanding, local governments are part of the federal system.171 And if
federalism is understood not simply to be a project of dividing power between the
federal government and the states, but of understanding and developing norms for the
system of interrelated actors that actually participate in governance in the United

See, e.g., Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 UC Irvine L. Rev. 177, 179 (2018)(“Particularly in
Supreme Court decisions, local governments have often been federalism’s forgotten stepchildren.”);
Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 133, 171
(2017)(“courts have long resisted seeing local governments as deserving of autonomy, and have never
treated home rule as providing any real federalism.”); Roscoe C. Martin, THE CITIES AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM, Atherton Press (1965), at 32 (“There is a general disposition for observers to
dismiss the subject of the place of the cities in the federal system with the brisk conclusion that cities
are not members of the federal partnership.”); see also, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental
Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward (noting that
federalism conversations often focus on the state and federal dynamic because “these are the two
levels of government the Constitution considers”).
167 Owen, supra n. _ at 225 (describing the “fallacy of the habit, which recurs throughout federalism
case law and theory, of collapsing state and local governance into a single category”).
168 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 133, 171
(2017)(“The root of the problem is that intrastate federalism is not a true federal system, in which
subgroups have constitutionally committed power, but a unitary system in which state legislatures
have ample room to decide how much authority to confer upon substate groups.”).
169 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: the Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 Yale L.J. 1792, 1867-68
(2019).
170 Some scholars, however, have argued for a reading of the Constitution that includes a textual basis
for local power. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shefali Milczarek-Desai, Constitutional Cities: Sanctuary
Jurisdictions, Local Voice, and Individual Liberty, 50 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 83 (2018).
171 See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, “City life and citizenship,” in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S
FEDERAL DEMOCRACY, Martha Derthick, ed. (Cambridge University Press 1999), at 17; Daniel J.
Elazar, “Cooperative Federalism,” in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid, eds.
(Urban Institute Press 1991), at 70, 74 (noting that “[t]he American system is a federal-state-localprivate partnership,” and accounting for local governments as actors within the “game” of the federal
system); Roscoe C. Martin, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Atherton Press (1965), at 32-33,
171 (“We have seen how the American federal system came to be expanded to include the cities as a
third partner.”).
166
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States,172 the absence of local governments is a glaring omission.173 Accordingly,
increasing numbers of scholars have worked to understand and articulate the role of
local governments within the federal system, and have incorporated them into
federalism theory.174
Modern conceptions of federalism might be said to accommodate a role for
local governments relatively easily. First, the realities of cooperative federalism make
the place of local governments within the federal structure quite apparent.175 Despite
the limits imposed by the anti-commandeering doctrine, cities are responsible for
carrying out many national mandates.176 Dave Owen has used the term “cooperative
subfederalism” to describe the power sharing relationships that local governments may
have with their individual states.177 In taking on these roles, local governments are
explicitly part of the federal system of government. The presence of local governments
within the federalism construct is perhaps at its most apparent within the
environmental realm. Local governments have traditionally been responsible for land
use regulation and the attendant early forms of environmental controls.178 As discussed
above, both federal and state actors also have powerful claims to authority in these
Supra n. _.
Cf. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance,
2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward. (noting that the fundamental question in federalism—that of “who
should decide?”—takes place at every level of government, including local government).
174 See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, HARV. L. REV. (2009) (making case for
consideration of local governments within federal system, and offering argument in favor local
initiative authority without local immunity); Roesler, supra n. _ at 1116 (applying different descriptive
normative theories of federalism “to understand their implications for local authority and power”);
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray
Area,” 66 MARYLAND L. REV. 503, 654 (2007)(promoting a more balanced take on federalism that
would insert a variety of values, including localism, into Tenth Amendment disputes); David J.
Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, DUKE L.J. (2001), at 381 (“The law of federalism
“defines the relations of the federal government vis-à-vis state and local governments”); see also, e.g.
Sarah Light, Advisory Nonpreemption (2018)(“many scholars of federalism—traditionally viewed as
encompassing only the federal government and the states—now incorporate local governments into
the analysis”).
175 See, e.g., Roscoe C. Martin, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Atherton Press (1965), at 33
(arguing that cooperative federalism can be said to bring local governments into the federalism
framework).
176 See, e.g., Roscoe C. Martin, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Atherton Press (1965), at 34,
111; see also Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (2017)(discussing
the ways in which the federal government regulates the conduct of the states, and in which states then
delegate federal responsibilities to local governments).
177 Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 177, 226 (2018)(describing the possible
virtues associated with a system of cooperative subfederalism, and noting that the result of this system
of state and local interaction is “federalism as a messy fractal pattern, which repeats itself—though
not with complete consistency—at multiple scales, not a binary division between the federal
government and everyone else”).
178 See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1406 (2012)(“Less than
fifty years ago, environmental regulation, like land-use regulation, occurred mainly at the local level.”);
supra section _.
172
173
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areas. In consequence, the competing interests that have made environmental
federalism debates regarding the federal and state governments particularly contested
also apply to the state and local actors.179
If cooperative federalism helps support a role for local governments in the
federal system in the first place, then support for a local role in environmental
federalism—which has been the main arena for many advances in and conversations
about cooperative federalism180—is particularly strong. Local governments are bound
by the standards contained in federal environmental programs, and are subject to
federal standards administered by states.181 For instance, federal drinking water
standards are often implemented in part by local governments, and those standards
impact local control over municipal water supplies.182 Local governments also engage
in monitoring air quality as part of the federal Clean Air Act,183 and implement species
protection programs under the Endangered Species Act.184 Through delegated
authority from state governments, local governments may also take on sizable roles in
controlling air and water pollution, remediating contaminated land, and land use
planning. All of these local responsibilities fall to some degree within longstanding
touchstones of the federal system of environmental law.
Functionally, then, local governments are part of the interrelated web of
government actors in environmental law. Beyond that, federalism values support a role
for local governments in federalism conversations.185 As described, central to
environmental federalism inquiries is the question of “who should decide.”186 Erin
Ryan has articulated the values relevant to that question as “voice, accountability,
autonomy, efficiency, and interdependence.”187 It is not difficult to see the role that
local governments can play in fulfilling each of these. For example, as to voice, Heather
Gerken’s scholarship has made clear the important role of local actors in exercising
voice, even (or perhaps especially) without the opportunity for exit.188 Similarly, values
such as interdependence and accountability have a mirror in the dynamic federalism
See, e.g., Owen, supra n. _ at _ (discussing application of federalism debate to state and local
relationship).
180 See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
179, 188 (2005).
181 Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, Urban Environmental Renaissance, CAL. L. REV. 25 (2020).
182 Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at 25; Hannah J. Wiseman, Delegation and Dysfunction, 35 YALE J.
ON REG. 233, 262, 264 (2018)(describing delegations of authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act).
183 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra n. _ at 285.
184 See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control Law:
Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 112 (2002).
185 E.g., Kathleen Claussen, Default Localism, or: How Many Laboratories Does It Take to Make A
Movement?, 48 Creighton L. Rev. 461, 464 (2015)(“The progressive federalists of today emphasize the
potentialities of local governance.”).
186 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good
Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward.
187 See, e.g., Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism, supra n. _ at _.
188 See, e.g., Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra n. _ at _.
179

26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559849

Localizing Environmental Federalism

27

values of plurality and redundancy,189 or the fact that “[w]hen one government fails to
address a problem, the other can step in and provide a remedy.”190 To advance those
values in the environmental context, scholars have called for a move away from static
allocations of authority, as assigning authority to one level of government “deprives
citizens of the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction, such as a built-in check upon
interest group capture, [and] greater opportunities for regulatory innovation and
refinement[.]”191 Local ability to take action when policy change at other levels of
government is stagnating offers an opportunity for local governments to strengthen
these federalism values.
Thus, in a theory of environmental federalism that values multilevel
governance possibilities, local governments offer another complementary layer. For all
of those reasons, environmental federalism scholars have recognized the role that local
governments may play in furthering relevant federalism values.192 The initiative
authority exercised by local governments means that they are frequently playing a
policymaking function, and providing many needed services to their citizens.193
Theories of dynamic environmental federalism have built upon that premise to offer
a normative account for the inclusion of local actors in federalism theory,194 pointing
out the ways that local governments may help to work through particularly
complicated governance questions and toward the attainment of federalism values.
The inclusion of local actors at a time when they are exercising increasing amounts of
influence and authority is the latest example of environmental federalism theory
shifting to reflect governance realities—and leading a shift in the governance
conversation for other areas as well.195
As with any federalism theory, the inclusion of local governments as a relevant
actor does not itself answer the question of “who should decide?” Instead, it inserts
local governments as a plausible answer to that question, depending on whether, in
any given situation, it is local governments that are best positioned to fulfill the
federalism values set out above. In many cases, for instance, the efficiency value will
weigh more in favor of action by the state or federal government than by many
Robert A. Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS, University of Chicago Press (2009), at 98-101.
190 See, e.g., Roesler, supra n. _ at 1150-51 (2015).
191 Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J.
159, 161 (2006).
192 Roesler, supra n. _ at 1152.
193 See, e.g., Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 181, 185 (2017)(“Cities
may occupy the lowest rung in our federal system. On a growing number of policy issues, however,
they have taken the lead in framing the debate.”).
194 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama
Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237, 271 (2011)(describing scholarship that “focuses on how to
incorporate the smallest or largest levels of governance into the traditional federal-state
conversation”).
195 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Response to Heather Gerken's 'Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?', 59 St.
Louis Univ. L.J. 1, 5 (2015).
189
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separate local actors. And there are many environmental problems for which state or
federal action may in fact be preferable. In our current political moment, however,
where inaction at the federal and state level may lead to concerns about the inability
to exercise voice or to promote accountability at those levels, dynamic environmental
federalism supports a look to the potential for local governments to provide an
affirmative environmental policymaking role. In this vision, the current role being
played by local actors in advancing environmental policies in the face of federal and
state inaction fits well with dynamic environmental federalism theories to date.
IV.

Environmental Federalism and the Loss of Local Authority

Local governments have thus been integrated into environmental federalism
in theory and in practice in a variety of ways. That integration has not meant,
however, that the unique characteristics of local governments in the United States
have received full attention. On the contrary, local governments are often grouped
together with the states in federalism discussions.196 To wit, federalism conversations
are frequently styled in terms of federal and sub-federal entities, with the latter
sometimes confined to states and sometimes including local governments. That
conflation has at times minimized the significance, virtues, and vulnerabilities of the
local role within the United States.197
Local governments may be positioned to fulfill federalism values in ways
similar to state actors. They are also quite different, however, in structure and in the
source of their authority. The recent trends in state and local relationships described
above have made clear the vulnerability of local governments to removal of their
ability to act on environmental issues. The ways in which these vulnerabilities differ
from states and among states means that local power structures warrant a fuller
consideration within the federalism conversation. This Section will describe local
governmental authority within the United States, and detail the mechanisms by
which such authority might be taken away. It will then discuss why treating local
power in the same way as state power obscures important elements of environmental
governance.

See, e.g., Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 Emory L.J. 877, 959 (2011)
(noting that “[e]ven those who argue for increased local government power tend to conflate the state
and local governments in debates about federalism.”); Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within:
Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503, 610-611 (2007).
197 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 UC Irvine L. Rev. 177, 225 (2018) (noting that
“[w]hile the conflations of state and local governance may be partly due to sloppiness, they also serve
a rhetorical purpose: they give states a boost in federalism’s classic power struggles”).
196
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A. Local Authority Within the Federal System
Local governments have deep roots in the United States.198 From the country’s
beginning, its residents organized themselves into units of local government. 199
Tensions between local autonomy and national unity combined to produce the failed
Articles of Confederation, and eventually, the United States Constitution and the
federal system as it exists today.200 The Constitution contains two provisions that are
particularly important to the articulation of roles within the federal system: Article IX,
the enumerated powers clause,201 and Article X, the reservation of powers to the
states.202 Nowhere is there a specific mention of, or reservation of power to, sub-state
bodies. Based on that textual reality, and a need for national unity, a judge-made
doctrine of state supremacy came to dominate in the United States.203 In reaction to
local efforts to exert their own authority, Judge John Dillon drafted a landmark
decision that declared that local governments “owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from, the legislature.”204 This decision, coupled with a
subsequent treatise by Judge Dillon, came to form the basis for a doctrine known as
Dillon’s rule. The position of state supremacy articulated in Dillon’s rule was cemented
in some ways by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, which
confirmed the view that local governments are mere creatures of the state.
As a formal matter, Dillon’s Rule and Hunter established fairly clear limits on
local autonomy. Practically, however, local governments continued to provide a
number of services to their citizens. And as the United States industrialized, and cities
grew, the pressing needs of the cities to exercise greater and greater levels of discretion
became clear.205 In response, states began to grant power known as home rule to their
cities. Home rule exists to allow local governments the authority to act on a variety of

See, e.g., Martin, supra n. _ at 21; cf. Pauline Maier, “Early American local self-government,” in
DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY, Martha Derthick, ed. (Cambridge
University Press 1999), at 70-71, 76 (discussing presence of local governments and “tradition of
strong local self-government,” but noting presence of centralizing forces as well).
199 See, e.g., Martin, supra n. _ at 21 (“A discussion of the American federal system which aspires to
realism must begin with an understanding that local government was here first.”).
200 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, University of Chicago Press (2009), at 32-34; Martin, supra n. _ at 23.
201 “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.” Article IX, US Constitution.
202 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Article X, US Constitution.
203 See Martin, supra n. _ at 29.
204 See Martin, supra n. _ at 29-30 (citing City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad
Company, 24 Iowa 455 (1868)).
205 See, e.g., Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, supra n. _ at 190; Fox, supra n. _ at 588.
198
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issues.206 That power is not derived from the federal Constitution, but is delegated by
the state, either through constitutional or legislative acts.207
In most states, local governments can exercise this grant of authority from the
state in a variety of ways. That authority, however, is subject to alteration, revocation,
or preemption by the state government. While the exact ways in which the authority
of local governments may be altered or withdrawn varies from state to state, it is
generally true that states wield a great deal of control over the extent of local authority.
In recent years, the new trends in state preemption of local authority have caused the
vulnerability of local governments to become a focal point of many state and local
government conversations. While scholars have discussed ways to preserve local
authority in the face of state preemption efforts,208 including efforts to redesign the
structure of the state and local relationship, states have been generally successful in
efforts to remove local authority as desired.209
Speaking from a very high level of generality, grants of home rule in the United
States have left local governments with little in the way of guarantees of power but a
great degree of functional autonomy, including over matters such as revenue
generation, land use controls, the ability to dictate the geographic scope of their
jurisdiction, and others.210 The lack of explicit structural protection at either the federal
or state level has left the lawmaking authority of cities quite vulnerable in
environmental and other policy realms. The most recent manifestation of this
vulnerability is in the waves of new methods of preemption that remove local authority
to act. In the environmental realm, then, local governments in some states face certain
barriers to action.
B. The Loss of Local Authority and Current Environmental
Federalism Frameworks
To this point, this Article has established that local governments act in many
ways to protect the environment, that those actions mean that local governments have
an important role to play in current environmental federalism conversations, and that
local governments are generally vulnerable to preemption by the state. Other
scholarship has detailed ways in which new trends in state preemption of local ability
to act might be concerning, including the undermining of local authority and the loss
See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Richard B. Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Return to the
Dark Ages Before Home Rule, Urban Lawyer, American Bar Association, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1982), p. viii
(“The fundamental purpose of home rule is to allow both the cities and the state to exercise power
coordinately so that problems can be solved at either or both levels of government.”).
207 Dale Krane et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK at _ (2001).
208 Briffault, Diller, Scharff, Davidson, Su, Reynolds
209 examples of litigation
210 David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, Duke L.J. at 393, 395-96 (2001); see also, e.g.,
Martin, supra n. _ at 32 (noting that “de jure the state is supreme, de facto the cities enjoy considerable
autonomy”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, Colum. L. Rev. (1990).
206
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of democratic legitimacy,211 gaps in democratic participation,212 loss of accountability213
and representation,214 and damage to the dignity of the individual and community. 215
While neither these new forms of preemption nor the concerns attached to them are
unique to environmental law, the potential impacts of these new forms of preemption
for environmental law and environmental federalism that are distinct enough to
warrant their own examination.
As described above, dynamic forms of environmental federalism have focused
on the attainment of federalism’s values as a metric by which to assess the benefits or
drawbacks of certain governance arrangements. For a variety of reasons, and as
described in more detail below,216 state removal of local authority to act can undermine
the attainment of environmental federalism goals. Thus, the undermining of
environmental federalism values through deregulatory preemption by the state brings

See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2-Remedying the Urban Disadvantage Through
Federalism and Localism, 77 La. L. Rev. 1045, 1049 (2017)(“there is good reason to question the
democratic legitimacy of preemption, particularly when targeted at large and densely populated urban
areas”); Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil Is King, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 1631, 1670 (2017)(“the
overuse of state preemption to overrule local authority undermines citizens’ faith in the democratic
process”); Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253, 258 (2004).
212 See David R. Berman, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY, POLITICS AND
POLICY (2003), at 155 (“One could argue that it is desirable to give local governments as much policymaking discretion as possible within this broader system because there is a lot to be done and the
federal government and states cannot do everything, because there is something to be said for
recognizing diversity and the need for a local input in devising solutions to problems, and because
local units are valuable as a means through which citizens can participate in civic affairs—and, indeed,
if localities don’t have the authority to make important decisions, there is no rational reason why
citizens should participate.”)
213 See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, DUKE LAW JOURNAL (2001), at
382 (noting that “[t]here is value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discretion to make the
decisions that their residents wish them to make,” and discussing the various benefits that can come
from local empowerment, including participatory and responsive government, diversity of policies,
flexibility, experimentation, and diffusion of power); see also, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa & Jonathan
Rosenbloom, “The cost of federalism: ecology, community, and the pragmatism of land use,” in THE
LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 261, Kalyani
Robbins, ed. (2015)(“Local governments are accountable in ways not felt at other levels of
government.”).
214 James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization . . . , 52
Kan. L. Rev. 1377, 1393-94 (year)(noting the greater relative influence of individuals in local elections,
which is important given that, “notwithstanding the ever-greater homogenization of the United States,
local communities still tend to have their own distinct identities and the shared values that give any
community cohesion.”).
215 Roderick M. Hills, Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J. L. & Pol.
187, 192 (2005) (in this framing, noting that it is not about the results achieved, but about who is
making the decision).
216 Infra section _.
211
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the dynamic squarely within the environmental federalism conversation. To date,
however, it has not been fully explored within that context.
This lack of treatment of state preemption of local authority by federalism
theorists is not particularly surprising—as mentioned, although environmental
federalism theory has integrated local governments into its analysis, it has largely done
so by grouping local governments with the states.217 Local governments may help to
achieve some of the same values as state actors; although there are good reasons for
not conflating the levels of government,218 the differences arguably matter less on the
plus side of the balance sheet. But modern environmental federalism theory does not
deal only with the benefits provided through the incorporation of different
governmental actors into federalism conversations. This body of work also treats the
question of how best to maintain the benefits that these governmental actors provide.
And the answer to the question of how best to preserve the benefits that local
government can provide in attaining federalism values is necessarily a very different
one than for state actors.
As noted, state and local governments draw their authority from distinct
sources. States are explicitly part of the constitutional structure, while local
governments are not.219 These structural differences have big impacts for thinking
about the preservation of a local role in environmental federalism. Most notably, a far
greater power imbalance exists between local and state governments than for states
and the federal government.220 Indeed, Robert Schapiro has noted that an important
element of his theory of polyphonic federalism is the reality that “neither the federal
government nor the states can eliminate the independent lawmaking authority of the
other.”221 The authority and practice of states removing the authority of local
governments raises unique questions.
To see why local governments are deserving of their own consideration, it may
be useful to consider the preemption analyses that have occurred to date in the federalstate context. To begin, environmental federalism conversations that focus on
Erin Ryan, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, at 51, 194-195 (Oxford Univ. Press)
(2011) (calling explicitly for consideration of localist values in federalism conversations, including “the
extent to which crossover protects local autonomy,” and the “extent to which crossover marginalizes
or discriminates against vulnerable localities,” but noting that the balanced federalism approach is
centered squarely in Tenth Amendment discussions and retains the federal-state dichotomy of
traditional federalism conversations); see also, e.g., Owen, supra n. _ at _.
218 See supra __.
219 See infra __.
220 See, e.g., Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 181, 189 (2017)(“There is
a certain irony, of course, that states now find themselves arguing against the same ‘localist’ values
that they so effectively used in attacking the expansion of federal authority. Yet it is also true, as many
state leaders point out, that the legal standing of the state vis-à-vis the federal government differs in
many important ways from the legal standing of the city in relation to the state.”).
221 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, University of Chicago Press (2009), at 96.
217
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preserving state authority tend to focus on questions of implied preemption, and how
to limit loss of authority within that framework.222 This focus makes sense; historically,
much of the role of courts in federal-state preemption cases has been to decide
whether the state action was impliedly preempted.223 Courts do so through a variety of
methods, including the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption. In its
various forms, implied preemption might be said to undermine dynamic forms of
federalism because it cuts off action by the state and the overall political process. 224
With implied preemption set up as a potential problem, dynamic federalists
have then sought a solution. One mechanism that scholars have endorsed, and that
the Supreme Court has employed in certain contexts, is the presumption against
preemption. As articulated by the Court, the presumption against preemption
“start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” This presumption both requires an express showing of preemptive intent
on the part of Congress and supports narrow interpretations of express preemption
language.225 Environmental federalism scholarship has at times endorsed judicial use
of the presumption against preemption to uphold dynamism between and among
actors in the federal system.226
In addition to the presumption against preemption, state interests might be
said to be protected in other ways as well in traditional preemption analyses. For
instance, where federal preemption of state interests is found to have occurred, it is
defended at times on the basis that federal representatives are accountable to their
state constituencies, and that state interests are therefore adequately protected. On
that theory, removal of state authority is less of a problem where state concerns can
be said to be adequately represented. Another level of protection against preemptive
actions may come from the degree to which courts scrutinize the amount of process
or expertise employed by the preempting body.227 Where that kind of expertise is not

See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory
L.J. 159, 163 (2006).
223 E.g., David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 507, 509 (2008).
224 See, e.g., Engel, Harnessing the Benefits . . . , at 163, supra n. _. (“Preemption, then, is the real
boogeyman of public interest lawmaking because it prevents the political process from policing
itself.”).
225 Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void Through Federal Preemption by
Inaction, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 5, 16 (2008); but see, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 733 (1991)(characterizing Supreme Court application of
presumptions as “fickle”).
226 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 609 (2008).
227 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for
Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1579 (2009).
222

33
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559849

Localizing Environmental Federalism

34

present, courts have been less willing to find a preemptive effect.228 And in the
context of tort law, the Supreme Court has disfavored interpretations of federal
preemption provisions that would leave an injured individual without a remedy.229
While these interpretations would not prevent Congress from eliminating all
remedies where it chose to do so, the Court has required a clear expression of
preemptive intent based on its discomfort with the lack of remedy otherwise
available.230 Taken together, these protections mean that while the preemption of
state authority is certainly not disallowed, it is disfavored in certain circumstances.231
A discussion that picks up in a similar vein is that involving the ceiling versus
floor preemption in the federal-state context. Using William Buzbee’s
characterization, a number of environmental federalism scholars have explored the
difference between ceiling preemption, or federal legislation that sets a limit on state
regulation, and floor preemption, which offers the federal legislation as a starting
point. These scholars generally agree that ceiling preemption poses more of a
problem for environmental federalism, and that it is appropriate in only limited
circumstances. To give life to these recommendations, some scholars have again
cautioned against the use of express ceiling preemption without strong
justification.232 Out of this protection and others emerges the general sense of a
preference against deregulatory preemption that is enforced through a variety of
scholarly rationales and judicial mechanisms. This judicial discomfort with stripping
away avenues of self-protection arguably reflects “the inherent legitimacy in allowing
the people to protect themselves by duly enacted means at the local, state or federal
level (or on all three levels).” Through this lens, gaps in governance that result in the
functional inability to exercise that right of self-protection may therefore be said to
run contrary to democratic traditions.233
Preemption in the state and local context raises similar but distinct issues.
There are many important differences between federal preemption of state law and
state preemption of local law. Most notably, while the Supremacy Clause protects a
realm of state authority, in many states no similar legal protections exist for local
governments. The types of preemption are often different as well—many of the
federal preemption cases deal with the question of when and how to infer
See, e.g., Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, supra n. __ at 1579; see also, e.g., Judith Resnik, The
Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 1105, 1144 (2008)(suggesting
that courts draw on principles found in the Chevron doctrine as to which level of government is
“relatively more or less politically accountable and technically expert”).
229 See Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing the Presumption Against Preemption to Prevent Regulatory Gaps:
Railroad Deregulation and Waste Transfer Stations, 34 Ecology L.Q. 1147, 1193-94 (2007).
230 Id. (Strickland)
231 See, e.g., Strickland n. __ at __; Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 928 (2008).
232 Glicksman & Levy, supra n. __ at 609.
233 Id. (Strickland)
228
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preemption, while no such analysis is needed as to newer forms of deregulatory
preemption, where the state law is explicitly designed to preempt the ability of local
governments to act. And while in some states a presumption against preemption of
local authority exists, the opposite—a preference in favor of state authority—
operates in others.234 Notwithstanding those very real distinctions in legal analysis,
many of the reasons for disfavoring deregulatory preemption are as true at the local
level as they are for the states.
A substantial case can be made, then, that deregulatory forms of local
preemption ought to be disfavored from the perspective of dynamic environmental
federalism theory. The mechanisms advanced to date as protection against this kind
of preemption in the federal-state context, however, will not suffice to prevent state
removal of local authority. The use of strategies like presumptions against
preemption—though perhaps not wholly unworkable—have less likelihood of success
when dealing with express forms of preemption targeted at local governments whose
vulnerability to preemption is in many ways a structural part of our system of
governance. Current dynamics have exposed the differences between state and local
authority, and have also resulted in a situation that may undermine the attainment of
federalism values. As such, it is worth thinking about the impact of these dynamics on
environmental governance, and how environmental federalism theory should respond.
Existing environmental federalism theories offer a deep grounding in the
values of environmental federalism, and how state and federal relationships play out
in the United States. Importantly, they also offer a sense of the fluidity of the political
sphere, and the need for federalism theory to reflect that same dynamism. As its shifts
have shown, federalism is both a legal and a political question. The need to respond
to and explain political realities has long been a part of the work of environmental
federalism scholars and others. Acknowledging the realities of local authority within
the environmental federalism conversation can help to ensure that theory reflects
political reality, and to provide a more complete sense of the possibilities for and the
limitations on local governments that undertake environmental policymaking.
V.

Localizing Environmental Federalism

Few mechanisms to protect local authority exist within the home rule
framework itself as currently interpreted,235 and local governments are therefore
vulnerable to removal of their authority over environmental and other issues. The
potential chilling effect that preemption may have on innovation at the state and local

[examples]
Some scholars have advocated for more expansive reading of home rule provisions that would
provide greater protection to local governments. See Richard Briffault, New Preemption, Stanford
Law Review (2018).
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235

35
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559849

Localizing Environmental Federalism

36

level is well-recognized.236 This vulnerability to preemption is a problem not only for
localism, but also for federalism, and for overall questions of governance.
Federalism is different than localism.237 Federalism, as described above, is both
a constitutional question and a set of norms, and has descriptive and normative
elements. Those elements are often, but not always, focused on the benefits of or
drawbacks to decentralization.238 Localism, in contrast, “defines the relations between
states and their local government.”239 It too also often has both descriptive and
normative components. Normatively, localism has been described as “a theory that
governments ought to be arranged to protect ‘democratic decentralization.’”240
As described above, some scholars reject the inclusion of local governments
within the broader federalism conversation. This section of the Article, however,
focuses explicitly on the role of local governments within the larger framework
provided by federalism theory. It does so while acknowledging the debate about the
distinctions between federalism and decentralization,241 and the historical origins of
the federalism debates.242 In many ways, however, the federalism conversation has
moved beyond those historical origins.243 Thus, this Article takes as a point of
departure not only that there are reasons for including local governments within the
federalism conversation, but that in fact, those conversations are already occurring.
This Article builds on the rationale presented in other works for why and how local
governments are relevant actors in the federalism realm. The intent is to provide
See, e.g., Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra n. __ at 66 (“a presumption against implied preemption in
environmental cases may certainly be appropriate. . . . The problem, however, is that [statutes] may
provide for express preemption. One option in an express preemption case is to urge the courts to
adopt a more purposive approach to interpreting preemption provisions. In close cases, such an
approach may dispositively tip the scales towards environmental interest.”); Richard Briffault, New
Preemption; Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256,
1304–05 (2009); Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, Emory L.J. at 381
(2017).
237 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: the Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792, 1810
(2019) (decrying the “neat conflation of localism and federalism,” on the basis that “[f]ederalism was
not simply the institutionalization of the myriad, localized ways in which early Americans dispersed
authority; its historical meaning was inseparable from the division of sovereignty solely between the
states and the federal government”); Richard Briffault, What About the ‘Ism’? Normative and Formal
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1349 (1994).
238 See Roesler, supra n. __ at 1134-1135; see also, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1, 2 (2002)(arguing that federal states have less decentralized localism than unitary states);
Richard Briffault, What About the ‘Ism’? Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47
Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1349 (1994) (“[i]f federalism is associated primarily with a set of values . . . that
are linked to decentralization, then federalism is not particularly about the states at all”).
239 Roderick M. Hills, Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J. L. & Pol.
187, 188-89 (2005).
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA
L. Rev. 903 (1994); Richard Briffault, What About the ‘Ism’?
242 See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra n. __ at __.
243 Heather Gerken, Federalism as a New Nationalism.
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additional context to the trends that federalism has already seen in the past decade,
and to clarify how such discussions might be made more useful and accurate.
Environmental federalism is a particularly useful framework for considering
the evolution of the inclusion of local governments within federalism frameworks. The
field of environmental federalism has long operated on the forefront of the national
federalism conversation. It has done so because it has retained a focus on describing
the realities of governance as they are happening.244 In that way, it differs from some
of the more theoretical presentations of the federalism debates. Thus, the realities of
shared competencies and authorities led environmental law to become a site of
innovation for cooperative federalism, and to provide new contours for the American
federalism conversation. In light of the conflicts in authority now occurring,
environmental federalism may be able to provide the same kinds of innovation and
examples for dynamic forms of power distribution that it previously did for
cooperative forms. The realities of power distribution between state and local
governments in the United States support further additions to the environmental
federalism conversation.
This Article sets out a framework for the development of a more localized
strand in environmental federalism theory that better addresses the realities of local
authority. Importantly, localized245 environmental federalism does not necessarily mean
localist246 environmental federalism. To localize environmental federalism means to
explicitly acknowledge and account for local actors, and for the vulnerabilities in
authority that they may confront. It does not put a thumb on the scale in favor of local
action over choices by other levels of government, or even describe when such local
action may be desirable. In that way, it differs from conversations regarding
subsidiarity247 and localism that may more explicitly preference local action. Instead,
the federalism lens here provides a platform for conversations about what the
vulnerability of local authority means for environmental law and environmental
federalism.

Ryan, Response to Heather Gerken, supra n. __.
The Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc., https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/localize (defining “localize” as “to give a local orientation”).
246 The Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc., https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/localism (defining localist as “strongly or unduly concerned with local
matters”).
247 Roderick M. Hills, Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J. L. & Pol.
187, 190 (2005); see also, e.g., Erin Ryan, “Environmental federalism’s tug of war within,” in THE LAW
AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 363, Kalyani Robbins,
ed. (2015)(defining the subsidiarity principle as “the directive to solve problems at the most local level
possible”); Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation . . ., 30 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. at 359 (2012)(“subsidiarity
theory posits that power and responsibility should be devolved to the lowest level of government
capable of exercising it well. The higher level of government must justify its retention of authority
over a given matter.”).
244
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Localized environmental federalism has three central tenets: 1) local
governments play a distinct role in environmental federalism; 2) environmental
federalism values may be impacted by the vulnerable nature of local authority; and 3)
because local authority varies in highly particularized ways, conversations about local
environmental governance must be more particularized too. Together, these tenets
offer a means of acknowledging the difference in state and local roles in the federal
system, and of developing a view about the potential for environmental governance
going forward.
A. Local governments play a distinct role in environmental
federalism conversations
As noted, environmental federalism conversations to date have tended to
conflate state and local authority.248 The discussion above makes clear the cost of such
conflations—a possibly inaccurate sense of the state of environmental federalism, and
the strategies available for upholding its values. Thus, it becomes important to tease
apart how to think about local governments as distinct entities within federalism.
Preceding sections of this Article discussed the role that local governments play in
fulfilling certain environmental federalism values.249
In many situations, local governments represent simply a more extreme
version of the federalism benefits provided by states. Again, as articulated by Erin
Ryan, the relevant federalism values are “voice, accountability, autonomy, efficiency,
and interdependence.”250 Depending on the political dynamics at any given time, local
governments may simply magnify the level of experimentation at the state level, 251 and
offer additional degrees of voice to the political process.252 As noted, that ability to
offer more localized policy perspectives and greater degrees of responsiveness to local
conditions is likely to be particularly relevant as environmental issues like climate
change require increasingly tailored responses. The environmental problems
confronting local governments are likely to be multiplied as existing problems of aging
infrastructure, low-density planning, and other exacerbators of environmental harms
meet the realities of climate change. These problems translate into day-to-day needs
for local governments that call for certain actions at some level of government.
Recent trends in dynamic federalism are also, however, focused quite explicitly
on plurality and redundancy.253 Beyond that, environmental federalism acknowledges

See infra.
See infra. section __.
250 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good
Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward.
251 Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 UC Irvine L. Rev. 177, 192 (2018).
252 See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra n. __ at __.
253 Robert A. Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS, University of Chicago Press (2009), at 98-101.
248
249
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the more practical problem-solving value of federalism.254 In a political moment where,
in many parts of the country, states are aligned with the federal government in ways
that make progress on environmental issues nonviable, local governments offer an
explicit means for redundancy in policymaking and for experimentation that otherwise
may not occur. It is for those reasons that local governments have attained such a
prominent role in environmental policymaking conversations. And it is for those same
reasons that local governments offer distinct federalism benefits from their states. Put
another way—in times where local governments are mirroring the actions of their
states, they may provide many of the same federalism benefits that states provide.
Those times where states and local governments are at odds, however, make clear the
potentially unique values offered by local actors.
The ability of local governments to move far beyond state and federal actors,
and to address environmental issues in a much more individualized way, gives them a
distinct identity when thinking about regulatory overlap and filling policymaking gaps.
Localized environmental federalism does not answer the question of why or when
local governments can, should, or must be permitted to pursue any policymaking
objective they see fit. The answer depends on the values associated with the federalism
conversation, as well as the realities of the state and local legal framework in the
relevant state. Taking a localized framework makes clear, however, that these local
actors merit their own discussion in terms of how and whether environmental
federalism values are being achieved at any given time.
B.

Environmental federalism values may be impacted by the
loss of local authority

Once the role of local actors in attaining certain environmental federalism
values is acknowledged, the impact of the loss of local authority becomes clearer as
well. To the extent that local governments are the relevant actor for achieving certain
environmental federalism values, the vulnerability of those local actors to preemption
by the state—particularly to forms of deregulatory preemption—means that the
attainment of those federalism values may be called into question. Perhaps most
significant is the potential for some methods of preemption to create regulatory
vacuums that frustrate local ability to work toward environmental protection, and
weaken the dynamism that underlies current environmental federalism theory. New
preemption measures may also have a chilling effect on the variety of approaches and
experimentation that will be crucial to combatting environmental issues like climate
change and continuing the long tradition of gap-filling within the environmental law
arena.255 Beyond that, state preemption measures may raise questions of environmental
justice and undermine efforts to ensure that benefits of environmental law and
environmental progress are spread equitably.
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503, 511 (2007).
See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for
Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1521, 1545 (2009) (noting that “in the
environmental area, parallel or overlapping laws are the norm.”).
254
255
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Regulatory Vacuums

As described, a federal administration hostile to federal environmental
protection has been a defining part of the past several years in the United States. In
consequence, states have in many cases become the next level of possibility for
environmental governance.256 In some cases, however, the legislative and executive
branches in state government have also displayed a recalcitrance toward environmental
protection. In those states, local governments present the most realistic possibility for
tackling environmental problems.257 Deregulatory preemption measures at the state
level, however, remove the ability of local governments to make needed policy changes
while failing to put in place a state framework to address the issue. In this way, removal
of local authority to act creates a compelled regulatory vacuum in environmental policy
response.258
For instance, plastic bag bans or fees instituted by a number of local
governments have been met by bans on those bans at the state level.259 Local
restrictions on the use of pesticides have also been a long-standing focus of
preemption efforts at the state level. These efforts have progressed to the point that,
“in most agricultural states in the Mississippi watershed, the regulation of pesticides
and fertilizer by local governments is straightforward—they cannot do it.”260 Similar
prohibitions on local action have been put into place with regard to local control over
the siting of confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), notoriously large sources
of air and water pollution. And local efforts to address the impacts of climate change
Doni Gewitzman, Complex Experimental Federalism, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 241, 244 (2015)(“When federal
inaction creates a policy vacuum, state policy experimentation may be the only available solution for
solving difficult social problems.”).
257 Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, Urban Environmental Renaissance, Cal. L. Rev. 36
(2020)(“local laws may be a way of realizing progressive policy preferences that have become
increasingly difficult to express at the federal level, or even state levels”).
258 See, e.g., Randall E. Kromm, Town Initiative and State Preemption in the Environmental Arena: A
Massachusetts Case Study, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 241, 256–57 (1998)(“Another negative effect of denial
authority is the possibility that incautious use will produce a regulatory vacuum on issues of
considerable importance”); George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of
Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 643, 660 (1993)(“Absent municipal home rule, the full
panoply of state government regulatory devices would ordinarily include the power to preclude all
regulation, which is effectively the power to create a vacuum. In the absence of state regulation, state
denial of municipal power creates such a vacuum.”). Like other scholarship, this discussion relies on a
plain meaning definition of regulatory vacuums—“matters of public concerns that are not addressed
at any level of government, with the added sense in the preemption context that governmental bodies
are frustrated from filling the void and addressing the problem.” Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing
the Presumption Against Preemption to Prevent Regulatory Gaps: Railroad Deregulation and Waste Transfer
Stations, 34 Ecology L.Q. 1147, 1216 (2007).
259 See Fox, Home Rule in an Era of Local Environmental Innovation
260 Shalanda Baker, Robin Kundis Craig, John Dernbach, Keith Hirokawa, & Sarah Krakoff, Beyond
Zero Sum Environmentalism, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10328, 10347 (2017) (providing
examples).
256
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have met with state bans on the ability to take on these challenges.261 Many other
instances exist of local action being taken to protect the environment, only to be met
with removal262 or attempted removal263 of local authority at the state level.
From a normative perspective that values environmental protection, these
vacuums are problematic because they make impossible local progress in
environmental law and policymaking. Environmental problems have significant
temporal and cumulative elements—that is, where environmental problems exist,
there are significant benefits to acting right away, at the risk of compounding the
problem for the future. Nowhere is this truer than for climate change, which needs
mitigation and adaptation efforts from all levels of government. The creation of
regulatory vacuums makes these needed actions much more difficult.264
Moreover, as described above, courts have in many circumstances disfavored
federal preemption of state actions where it would create regulatory gaps. Like in the
federal-state context, state removals of local authority, without corresponding state
action on the issue, present barriers to responsiveness and to fulfillment of federalism
values. Indeed, several of the indicators for when the creation of gaps in governance
via preemption should be disfavored are present in the context of many state removals
of local authority. For instance, deregulatory state action cannot generally be justified
based on local representation at the state level. Dramatic changes in state legislative
districting call into question the extent to which cities—particularly urban areas—are
adequately represented at the state level.265 The extent to which the most populous
local governments in most states are proportionately underrepresented may lessen the
See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Protecting the Environment in an Era of Federal Retreat, FIU Law Review 30
(2018)(citing Ala Code s 35-1-6(b), which provides that “[t]he State of Alabama and all political
subdivisions may not adopt or implement policy recommendations that deliberately or inadvertently
infringe or restrict private property rights without due process, as may be required by policy
recommendations originating in, or traceable to “Agenda 21,” adopted by the United Nations in 1992
at its Conference on Environment and Development or any other international law or ancillary plan
of action that contravenes the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of
Alabama”).
262 See Davidson/Reynolds/Briffault
263 Ryan Hackney, Don’t Mess with Houston, Texas: the Clean Air Act and State and Local Preemption, 88
Tex. L. Rev. 639, 645 (2010) (discussing actions in Houston to address air quality issues, and noting
that, “[i]n March of 2007, Mike Jacksons, the Republican senator . . . introduced a bill in the Texas
Senate that sought to prohibit local governments from regulating pollution coming from outside of
their boundaries”)
264 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void Through Federal Preemption
by Inaction, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 5, 14 (2008); see also, e.g., Franklin R. Guenthner, Reconsidering Home Rule
and City-State Preemption in Abandoned Fields of Law, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 427, 429 (2017)(“The legal trend .
. . has been toward parent political bodies passing preemptive laws without prescribing affirmative
policies to replace the newly defunct ordinances, effectively abandoning the field of law and nullifying
it at the local level. The consequence is a signal to cities across these states that they are powerless to
find their own solutions to issues that directly impact them—and, in extreme cases, to chill future
local legislation altogether.)
265 See, e.g., Paul Diller re: gerrymandering
261
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persuasive force of arguments that representation of local governments in the state
legislature renders regulatory vacuums unproblematic. And from a process
perspective, this kind of removal of local authority by the state is potentially
concerning given the brevity of process, expertise, and legislative language expended
on the topics.266
For all of these reasons, regulatory vacuums present more than a matter of
competing policy preferences. As described above, environmental federalism theory
has made clear the virtues of dynamism and multiscalar governance. Interactive
environmental federalism eschews designated roles for federal and state actors, and
instead calls for overlapping authority among the different levels. The existence of
multiple levels of authority has long been part of the political safeguards within the
U.S. system.267 One of the tenets of the federalist system is that if you don’t like results
at one level of government, you can look to another.268 Put another way, and drawing
on the work of Robert Schapiro, state limitations on local authority to act might be
said to cut off the “polyphony” of federalism.
Elimination of local authority to address a problem without putting in place a
state or federal regulatory structure takes away redundancies within the system of
environmental governance, and disrupts the historic gap-filling dynamic that has
occurred in environmental law. Where state preemption of local laws eliminates the
ability of local governments to act to address questions of environmental health and
safety—without affirmative policymaking action by the state—an important
component of governmental interplay and overlap is undermined or lost. The loss of
those kind of backstops creates barriers to effecting environmental protection
measures, and undermines the descriptive reality of environmental federalism
conversations that rely on the potential for local governments to promote and satisfy
the values of dynamism.
2. Lack of Innovation and Experimentation
Innovation is often one of the primary justifications raised in favor of local
control,269 and one of the primary values cited in federalism conversations. Justice
Talk with NYU professor for sources
William Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 1037,
1045 (2017) (“retaining . . . state authority . . . fosters overall stability, creates room for regulatory
innovation, and thereby creates conditions conducive to private investment to meet regulatory goals”).
268 David R. Berman, STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS, Holbrook Press (1975), at 4.
269 See, e.g., Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional
Decisionmaking, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 362 (2012) (“Perhaps no feature of subfederal
governance is lauded more frequently than its association with innovation. Local regulation often is
considered more innovative than state regulation . . .whether because the sheer number of local
governments increases the chances of a good idea emerging or because it is relatively easier to get a
local law enacted and tested out in practice.”); see also, e.g., Shannon Roesler, Federalism and Local
Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1149 (2015) (quoting Adelman/Engel likening
266
267
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Brandeis’s famous invocation of state laboratories of democracies as one of the main
values of federalism applies in equal or greater measure to local governments. In the
broader federalism context, Heather Gerken has noted that “it is hard to jumpstart a
national movement. That’s why virtually every national movement began as a local
one.”270 Local innovation allows policymakers to respond as needed to changing
conditions,271 and to learn from other jurisdictions.272 To some extent, loss of
dynamism and “lively conflict,” or “political entrepreneurship,” is a feature of even
traditional forms of preemption.273 Paul Diller has discussed Roderick Hills’ work on
arguments against preemption in this regard in the context of state and local
interactions.274
Loss of innovation in the environmental context may be particularly alarming
at a time when novel environmental problems are confronting all jurisdictions. Most
notably, global warming and the attendant consequences of climate change render
jurisdictional lines inconsequential. Local control over environmental issues could be
important for combatting these issues, given that higher levels of experimentation at
the local level are likely to lead to more positive outcomes.275 Beyond that, genuine
diversity in environmental conditions and needs even within individual states may call
for a variety of responses. And while some elimination of diversity is inevitable with
any kind of preemption, newer forms of preemption that explicitly eliminate diversity

“jurisdictional plurality to ‘ecological niches in a forest’ . . . Just as selection pressures . . . allow
diversity to survive, the myriad horizontal and vertical interconnections between jurisdictions allow
innovations to spread.”).
270 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1695, 1713 (2017).
271 See David R. Berman, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES . . . (2003), at 155; see also Rebecca
Bratspies, Protecting the Environment in an Era of Federal Retreat, FIU Law Review, at 30 (2018) (“the more
latitude that local communities have to tailor governance to local conditions, the more likely it is that
we can ensure the level of flexibility necessary for responding to climate-induced risks.”).
272 See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 Harv. J. on Legis. 289,
304 (2011)(“ novel state and local environmental and land use laws often serve as a catalyst for further
government action, encouraging regulation in areas that otherwise would not be addressed”); see also,
e.g., Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2-Remedying the Urban Disadvantage Through Federalism and
Localism, 77 La. L. Rev. 1045, 1102 (2017)(noting local role in providing “nodes of policy
experimentation”).
273 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 21, 36 (2007).
274 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1149 (2007).
275 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization . . .
, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 1377 (year)(“Does decentralization improve our prospects for getting the objectives
right? Absolutely, at least more often than not.”); Daniel Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the
Constitution, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 879, 920 (2008)(making policy argument against preemption of local
control on the basis that “we should embrace climate actions by whoever undertakes them, for it is
more likely that the actions will be too little than that they will be too much”); Sarah Adams-Schoen,
Beyond Localism: Harnessing State Adaptation . . . , MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 185, 193 (2018) (citing
work that characterizes local communities as “important laboratories for climate change action”).
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and innovation without a competing state or federal structure276 have a particularly
dramatic impact in quashing innovation.
3. Environmental Justice
In many ways, the loss of local authority can be conceived of in the same way
as thinking about loss of other federalism voices. For example, theories of interactive
environmental federalism call for a move away from the static allocations of authority
inherent in dual federalism, and toward overlapping allocations of state and federal
authority. This shift is important in part because assigning authority to one level of
government “deprives citizens of the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction, such as a
built-in check upon interest group capture, [and] greater opportunities for regulatory
innovation and refinement[.]”277
Local governments can be sites of minority empowerment.278 By providing
opportunities for majority-minority rule, these governments make possible the
prevailing of viewpoints and policy choices that might otherwise be drowned out. 279
This representation is another of the federalism values that can be achieved through
inclusion of substate actors.280 In the environmental context, disproportionate impacts
find expression within the environmental justice framework. Environmental
federalism and environmental justice are separate but interacting paradigms.281 Where
environmental federalism looks at governance within the federal system,
environmental justice focuses on the unequal exposure to environmental harms, and
unequal access to environmental benefits, often experienced by communities of color
and low-income communities.282
Environmental justice scholarship often focuses on the need for local input as
a means of providing accurate information about community impacts and of
See, e.g., William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82
NYU L. Rev. 1547, 1555 (2007) (arguing that “[p]rincipled rationales exist to distinguish and embrace
a protective federal one-way ratchet of floor preemption, or at least to see floor preemption as less
institutionally problematic than the new breed of ceiling preemption that this Article refers to as
‘unitary federal choice preemption,” and noting that unitary federal choice preemption is distinct in
that it “precludes additional state and local protections and eliminates institutional diversity that its
preserved (though limited) by floor preemption.”).
277 Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J.
159, 161 (2006).
278 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Abandoning Bad Ideas and Disregarding Good Ones for the Right Reasons:
Reflections on A Festschrift, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 535, 536 (2013).
279 Heather Gerken
280 See, e.g., Gerken; see also, e.g., Richard Briffault, New Preemption, Stanford Law Review, at 2009
(“Some preemption measures have the effect of shifting decisionmaking authority from majorityminority local governments to a white-dominated state government.”).
281 See, e.g., Robert W. Collin, Environmental Justice in Oregon: It’s the Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 413, 417 (2008)
(describing relationship of environmental federalism and environmental justice).
282 See, e.g., Fox, Environmental Gentrification, supra n. __ at __.
276
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remedying the power imbalance that is responsible for the disproportionate nature of
environmental harms in the first instance.283 When local governments are left without
the ability to remedy environmental problems, it may raise justice implications for local
governments and their citizens.284 That potential is exacerbated in situations where
power is not only being centralized, it is being taken away without a substitute
framework being put in place. Eliminating the ability of local governments to solve
environmental problems, without putting in place any state framework to tackle the
issue, makes it much more difficult to provide solutions to remedy problems of
disproportionate impacts.285 By disempowering potentially vulnerable communities
without putting in place a statewide system, state preemptive measures warrant
skepticism from an environmental justice standpoint.286 And because this undermines
the fulfillment of federalism’s value of voice, it is a problem for environmental
federalism as well.
Generally speaking, the vulnerabilities of local government to state preemption
have been well-examined in terms of the impacts on local governance. The above
considerations make clear that recent preemption dynamics are significant not only
from a local government perspective, but from a federalism perspective as well. Where
local governments are providing federalism benefits beyond the state, then curtailment
of their ability to act may also curtail the fulfillment of certain federalism values.
Current politics will certainly shift again with regard to the state and local relationship
may change. The overall structural vulnerabilities of local governments mean that this
subject will remain relevant,287 however, in considering the role of local governments
in environmental law and environmental federalism, and in policymaking more
broadly.
C. Because local authority varies in highly particularized ways,
conversations about the local role in environmental
federalism must be particularized too
As described above, environmental federalism has been on the front lines of
incorporating the realities of governance into broader theoretical conversations.288 In
See, e.g., Collin, supra n. __ at 418.
See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-d: A Framework for
Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 Harv. J. on Legis. 19, 88 (2014) (citing
Environmental Federalism 259, 263 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) for its argument
“that a centralized approach to environmental justice issues would be unresponsive to local conditions
and needs”).
285 See, e.g., Robert W. Collin, Environmental Justice in Oregon: It's the Law, 38 Envtl. L. 413, 419 (2008).
286 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, at 194 (Oxford University Press
2011).
287 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU Envtl. L.J. 108, 108
(2005)(“policy analysts should seek to distinguish events that are the result of particular historical
opportunities and context, from propensities and incentives that are more stable and predictable
under current forms of environmental federalism”).
288 See, e.g., Ryan; Owen
283
284
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consequence, it is well-suited to respond to trends of new preemption and the lessons
they hold. Dynamic environmental federalism conversations have already worked to
expand federalism conversations beyond the state and federal realm, and beyond the
idea of fixed roles for all governmental actors. Those discussions should now expand
again to explicitly acknowledge the presence and importance of local actors, and the
differences in the ability to exercise that power.
Giving full consideration to the presence of local actors within environmental
federalism requires their separation from the states not only in thinking about the
benefits that local actors can provide, but also in considering the vulnerabilities of local
action. A full discussion of when and whether local governments are well-suited to act
on environmental issues is a conversation that should continue in the context of
specific issues. To the extent, however, that local governments are well-positioned to
act on an issue, there is another set of inquiries. Namely, proponents of environmental
action at the local level should consider the variability of governance frameworks in
place in the relevant states.289 In many of those states, the local government will have
the authority to act but will have little protection from state interference.290
In the current political landscape, the map of where local control might be
most desirable from an environmental federalism perspective—in terms of offering
dynamism benefits and taking policy action where none is currently occurring—may
look similar to a map of the local governments most vulnerable to deregulatory
preemption measures. A more localized environmental federalism helps to make clear,
then, the costs of relying on the potential for environmental policy change at the local
level without consideration of the ways in which local governments are different from
state actors. A localized environmental federalism lens shows that whatever the
federalism benefits that local governments have to offer, they may be prevented in
some cases from fulfilling those desired roles. Simply acknowledging those dynamics
is an important element of thinking about viable paths to environmental policy
problems.
D.

Localized Environmental Federalism—An Illustration

To further the understanding of the difference that a localized environmental
federalism framework could make, an illustration from the climate change arena may
be useful. Climate change conversations have focused on the potential for local action
as a means of pursuing adaptation and mitigation strategies alike. As explained above,
the federal government has retreated from climate protection measures, and state
activity varies widely. In both politically conservative and politically liberal states,
however, local governments have pursued their own actions on climate, including
energy efficiency policies, open space planning, flood management, and more. When
viewing those actions, a localized environmental federalism lens does not insert
See, e.g., Andrea McArdle, Local Green Initiatives: What Local Governance Can Contribute to Environmental
Defenses Against the Onslaughts of Climate Change, 28 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 102, 114-15 (2016).
290 See, e.g., Richard Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 Texas Law Review 1163, 1184 (2017).
289
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another value into the federalism discussion. Instead, it makes possible a more accurate
assessment of when local governments are providing additional federalism benefits,
and whether they will be able to fulfill their distinct federalism roles.
Applying the localized environmental federalism framework, it must first be
acknowledged that the kinds of local governments mentioned above are fulfilling
important federalism benefits—namely, gap-filling and the exercise of voice, distinct
from the states in which they are located. Thus, on their face, dynamic environmental
federalism perspectives would predict and support such endeavors. In many instances,
however, authority to take these actions on climate has been removed by the states.
The ability of local governments to fulfill those values thus depends on the particular
nature and politics of state and local relationships.
For example, New York City has taken the lead on many climate changerelated policies, including those involving emissions controls. One effort to promote
emissions reductions came in the form of New York City’s proposed traffic congestion
pricing measure—a tolling system that charged by zone.291 No such congestion and
emission control measures existed at the state or federal level; the initiative was part
of the City’s efforts to innovate in the area of climate change. That measure, however,
was preempted by the state of New York when it was first passed, without immediately
putting in place a similar statewide scheme. In preempting the local government, the
state arguably impinged on the City’s fulfillment of certain environmental federalism
values. That preemption was not the end of the story, however—in 2019, New York
State passed its own legislation allowing for congestion pricing.292 Even though local
preemption on the issue is still in place, the state’s action undid the damage to
federalism values done through the blocking of local activity.
The New York City experience can be contrasted with that of Phoenix, which
attempted to address climate emissions by implementing a benchmarking requirement.
That requirement would have made mandatory the disclosure of overall energy
consumption of commercial properties, in an effort to make possible informed
decision making on the part of consumers. The passage of that measure in Phoenix,
however, was followed by a piece of state legislation that removed the authority of
local governments to impose benchmarking requirements, without putting in place any
kind of state framework to do the same.293 In this second scenario, the local
government loses the ability to fulfill the gap-filling and voice functions. As for New
York City, federalism values are undermined by state action. Without any kind of state
See, e.g., WBEZ, “New York Is Set To Be First U.S. City To Impose Congestion Pricing,”
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709243878/new-york-is-set-to-be-first-u-s-city-to-imposecongestion-pricing
292 New York State, Department of Taxation and Finance, “Congestion surcharge,”
https://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/cs/csidx.htm
293 See, e.g., NAIOP, “NAIOP Arizona Blocks Energy Benchmarking Ordinance,”
https://www.naiop.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Magazine/2016/Fall2016/Advocacy/NAIOP-Arizona-Blocks-Energy-Benchmarking-Ordinance
291
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action that has taken place yet or can be expected to come, Phoenix as a local entity is
unable to incorporate benchmarking into its climate planning. Given the lack of action
on energy efficiency matters at the Arizona state level, as well as at the federal level,
state preemption undermines the framework of dynamic environmental federalism.
Indeed, in such states, it could be said that models of how environmental federalism
functions are breaking down.
Current models of environmental federalism do not address the difference in
outcomes in different states based on the availability and likelihood of state
preemption. For instance, Erin Ryan has provided the seminal account of how
environmental federalism issues are negotiated among federal, state, and local actors.294
Providing a realistic account of state and local relationships in their current form
means acknowledging the lack of negotiation that is occurring in some states. Where
new forms of preemption mean that negotiation around federalism roles is stopped in
its tracks, the benefits of federalism may become more difficult to realize. These
scenarios help to show that it would be a mistake to assume that local governments
don’t matter in the area of environmental law. They are responsible for much of the
innovation in environmental work currently going on in the field. At the same time,
continuing the trend of grouping these local actors in with states elides some of the
complexity in those interactions. And at the very least, the realities of state preemption
halt some of the fluidity assumed in current federalism models.
A more localized form of environmental federalism helps to explain when local
governments in the current system of government might be relied upon to uphold and
maintain dynamism within environmental law and policy, and when they may not able
to perform that role. Acknowledging those dynamics may be important from a judicial
perspective. Judges have long been the final arbiters of the relative scope of authority
attributed to various levels of government, often drawing on “federalism as a value”
when asked to resolve jurisdictional disputes.295 These values have long been at the
heart of judicial decisions allocating power among the various levels of government.
They may now provide a useful tool for making clear the costs of deregulatory state
preemption of local authority over the environment. Making clear the impacts of these
kinds of preemption measures from an environmental federalism perspective may not
ultimately impact judicial outcomes. It may, however, make courts more attuned to
the larger impacts and context of cases that result in the loss of local authority over
the environment.
VI.

Conclusion

The discussion above explains the significance of local governments as
environmental policy actors within the United States, and highlights in particular their
role as gap-fillers when other levels of government are inactive. At the same time that
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good
Governance, 2017 Wis. L. Rev., Forward.
295 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Freedom, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 499, 510 (1995).
294
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theories of dynamic environmental federalism have emphasized the virtues of
intergovernmental interplay, however, forms of preemption different in type and in
volume from their predecessors are cutting off that dynamism. This new dynamic
hampers the ability of local governments to respond to problems as needed.296 A
variety of remedies to this problem have been proposed, including new models of
home rule297 and different interpretations of rules already in place.298 The discussion
herein emphasizes the need to acknowledge the limitations that face local governments
alongside discussions of their potential for fulfilling environmental federalism values.
Local actors are critical players in the dynamic forms of federalism that seek
to acknowledge the realities of governance in the United States today. The United
States has long had a federal system capable of adaptation and flexibility.299
Conversations about federalism have also been characterized by a number of
fundamental shifts.300 Environmental law—which emphasizes the importance of facts
on the ground301—offers an important framework for thinking about these new
realities, given the scale of the environmental problems facing the country, the timesensitive nature of the need to address them, and the competing claims to power that
exist among the national, state, and local governments.
As the environmental federalism conversation has advanced, it has become
increasingly vested in a dynamic vision of authority shared among and between the
federal, state, and local governments. Clarifying the role of local governments within
this system will help to ground involvement of local governments in doctrine that can
foster greater assurance and action moving forward.302 Adopting this broader view also
See, e.g., Jonathan Rosenbloom, “XI. Less Than Zero: The Zero-Sum Game That Hurts Local
Communities and Ecologies,” in Shalanda Baker, et al., “Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism,” 47
ENVLRNA 10328, 10346 (2017) (“Local governments and their ecology suffer hardship from a zerosum game over governance authority. This game pits communities (and their local governments . . . )
against state governments in a constant and unwinnable(ish) conflict over the authority to regulate, or,
as it happens, not regulate.”).
297 See, e.g., National League of Cities, Home Rule for the 21 st Century.
298 See, e.g., Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, Urban Environmental Renaissance, Cal. L. Rev. 54
(2020) (proposing that (1) “courts have sometimes interpreted the scope of residual local authority
under the federal environmental statutes more narrowly than those statutes require; and (2) “[t]here
may also be room to expand the scope of local environmental lawmaking authority under state law”).
299 Roscoe C. Martin, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Atherton Press (1965), at 21.
300 See, e.g., Martha Derthick, “How many communities?,” in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S
FEDERAL DEMOCRACY, Martha Derthick, ed. (Cambridge University Press 1999), at 136-42
(discussing the shift in federalism philosophy that occurred during the Warren era of the Supreme
Court in the context of school desegregation).
301 Erin Ryan
302 Keith H. Hirokawa & Jonathan Rosenbloom, “The cost of federalism: ecology, community, and
the pragmatism of land use,” in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 266, Kalyani Robbins, ed. (2015)(“ “[t]he failure of many local governments
cannot be described simply as a failure of local governments to act or to care about their local
environments. Rather, it is a failure of environmental federalism to account for local communities’
connection to the environment and to incorporate that connection into the law”
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makes possible a greater variety of paths forward, toward newly dynamic forms of
environmental law and policymaking.
No instant solution is available to resolve the barriers to local environmental
action currently being erected around the country. At bottom, these are political
choices being made by states that, generally speaking, have the power to make them.
This Article offers a new lens for thinking about those barriers, however, and for
incorporating them into the broader conversation. As local actors are incorporated
more broadly into the federalism conversation, the potential for the loss of the
federalism values that local governments provide is important to acknowledge. A
localized framework for thinking about environmental federalism can help to provide
that perspective.
Local action on environmental issues is not always the ideal; indeed, many
times, there are more desirable actors on environmental problems within the federal
system.303 But in an era where little action is occurring at other levels of government,
and where local governments will face a variety of individualized issues, local actors
have an important role to play in tackling the environmental problems to come.
Acknowledging that reality, and integrating a clear-eyed perspective on when and
whether local governments will be able to play that role, is an important aspect of
discussing the state of environmental federalism. Accurately incorporating local
governments into broader conceptions of environmental federalism may help to
advance both dynamism and environmental progress.
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